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As natural disaster risks continue to increase as a result of climate change, insurance 
companies and other institutions struggle to find ways to deal with these risks. There is a 
propensity for these risks to be financialized and distributed through the market. 
Catastrophe bonds are indicative of this trend for environmental problems to be 
represented through financial and market instruments. This thesis expands upon the 
critical literature surrounding catastrophe bonds through an analysis of the bonds 
themselves, acting as an exposé of their nature and processes. It explores how 
environmental risks are being financialized while exposing the separation of the temporal 
and spatial aspects of natural catastrophes that manifest through this process. This 
research consists of an in-depth deconstruction and analysis of catastrophe bonds in 
addition to qualitative interviews with three catastrophe bond experts. It makes use of 
relational economic geography to map the processes, actors, and infrastructure of 
catastrophe bonds to offer a critique of their development and function. It analyzes these 
bonds from creation to distribution through three mechanisms of financialization: 
ownership, commensuration and mobilization.  
This thesis demonstrates how catastrophe bonds are a form of financialization and argues 
that transforming environmental risks into exchange values is a form of time-space 
compression. The separation of the spatial and temporal aspects of natural disaster risk 
from their exchange value can lead to distortion and undervaluation of these risks. 
Through this analysis of catastrophe bonds and the process of the financialization of 
environmental risk, this research aims to analyze these bonds as a mechanism for dealing 
with climate change risk. This research can be extended to other forms of financialization 
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The increasing risks of natural disasters associated with climate change increase the 
frequency and severity of financial losses (Van Aalst, 2006; López Vega et al., 2015; 
Phalkey & Louis, 2016). These financial losses are of direct concern to the insurance 
industry as they are often responsible for providing financial coverage for damages 
incurred from these natural disasters. The potential financial losses that the insurance 
industry could face in the event of large or even simultaneous natural disasters could 
outweigh their financial capacity (Loubergé et al., 1999; Edesess, 2015). Typically, 
insurance companies turn to reinsurance to take on some of their financial risks, however, 
as climate change induced natural disasters continue to threaten the financial stability of 
the insurance industry, the need for reinsurance coverage has surpassed what the 
reinsurance industry is able to cover (Cummins & Weiss, 2009). Catastrophe bonds are a 
way to transfer insurance risks to the capital market. This thesis examines catastrophe 
bonds and their transformation of environmental risks into financial figures. It explores 
the financialization of environmental risks and the separation of the temporal and spatial 
aspects of natural catastrophes that manifest through the catastrophe bond market.  
1.1 Catastrophe Bond Developments and Structure 
In 1992, Hurricane Andrew hit Southern Florida and became the most costly 
hurricane in U.S history (Rappaport, 1994; Edesess, 2015), causing 17 billion USD of 
industry losses in Florida alone (Swiss Re, 2011). The losses from this hurricane 
superseded what insurance risk managers had expected, ultimately forcing several 
insurance companies to file for bankruptcy (Swiss Re, 2011; Edesess, 2015). As a result 
of this shock to the insurance industry, many insurers refused to offer similar coverage in 
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the future and began to seek new ways to manage their risk (Edesess, 2015). Insurers 
wanted to make sure that in the case of future natural disasters they would not become 
bankrupted by damages. Based on these worries and the need for new innovative 
mechanisms to deal with insurance risk, the use of alternative risk transfer (ART) became 
common. Insurance-linked securities (ILS), and specifically catastrophe (cat) bonds, 
emerged on the market and began to see increasing growth for insurers looking for 
alternative ways to transfer their risks. 
Cat bonds offer a way for insurance companies to find reinsurance coverage from 
outside investors, thus reducing their risk for bankruptcy. These bonds are a type of ILS 
in that their values are linked to insurance loss events. Cat bonds represent coverage for a 
specific natural disaster risk. The bonds transfer the natural disaster risk from an 
insurance company to investors. The investors take on the risks of a specific catastrophe 
for a fixed period of time. If the disaster does not occur, the investors will gain a positive 
return on their investment through interest rates on their investments and insurer coverage 
payments. However, if the disaster does occur, the investor will lose the principal they 
invested and the insurance company will receive that money to cover the losses of the 
disaster. Figure 1 below illustrates the typical structure of a catastrophe bond.  






There are various actors involved in cat bond transactions. The bond begins with a 
sponsor or issuer, which is usually an insurance company, identifying natural catastrophe 
risk that they want coverage for. This sponsor then hires a risk modeller to analyze the 
risk and potential losses. These risk modellers typically use catastrophe modelling and 
stochastic risk analysis to estimate the range of potential catastrophes as well as the 
estimated losses from the hypothetical catastrophe (Van Leer, 2015). The natural disaster 
risk coverage that the sponsor is looking for is then translated into a dollar amount, which 
becomes the amount of investment the cat bond requires.  
After risk modelling, the trigger type for the proposed cat bond is established. The 
trigger type refers to the terms that have to be met in order for the cat bond to be paid out 
to the sponsor. Common triggers for cat bonds are indemnity, industry loss, modelled, 
and parametric index triggers (Artemis, 2017b). After the price and trigger type have 
been decided on, the sponsor enters into an agreement with a special purpose vehicle 
(SPV) for the particular risk coverage. The sponsor pays the SPV premiums for this 
coverage. The SPV then sells the bond through securities to investors. The funds 
generated by the purchase of the bonds become the collateral, which will cover the 
sponsor’s risk in case the qualifying event occurs. The collateral is put into an account to 
collect interest. In return for offering the collateral, the investors receive part of the 
premiums the sponsor is paying for the risk coverage, as well as interest from the 
collateral account. If the qualifying event occurs, the collateral account will be liquidated 
in order to reimburse the sponsor based on the cat bond agreement and investors will lose 
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their money. If the qualifying event does not occur, the collateral account is liquidated 
and investors are repaid their initial investment (Artemis, 2017b).  
1.2 Catastrophe Bond Market 
The cat bond market has seen considerable growth in the past decade with the 
market totalling $26.82 billion by the end of 2016 (Artemis, 2016a). Figure 2 shows the 
cumulative volume of risk capital that has been issued since the inception of the cat bond 
market. Cat bonds are attractive to investors for diversification purposes as they allow 
them to spread their investment risk across the market and enhance their portfolios 
(Bantwal & Kunreuther, 2010). Cat bond returns are uncorrelated to the broader financial 
market (Edesess, 2015; Cummins, 2008; Litzenberger et al., 1996) and offer high returns 
with annual growth rates of approximately 8 or 9 percent (Swiss Re, 2011). Since 2002, 
cat bonds have yet to incur a twelve-month period with a negative return (Swiss Re, 
2011). 
Figure 2: Catastrophe Bond Market by Issuance  
 




The cat bond market is predicted to continue to see increased growth (Phillips, 
2014; Johnson, 2015; Edesess, 2015) with some scholars predicting the bonds may 
eventually be issued in the public market, rather than solely privately (Cummins, 2008). 
As mounting evidence continues to emerge indicating that climate change will result in 
an increase in natural disasters (Van Aalst, 2006; López Vega et al., 2015; Phalkey & 
Louis, 2016), the issuance of cat bonds continues to grow in response (Cummins, 2008).  
1.3 Problem Statement 
As the cat bond industry becomes a more prominent way of dealing with natural 
disaster risks, there is a need for a closer examination of this tool and its ability to 
adequately address environmental catastrophe risks. There is a propensity for 
environmental risks or problems to be represented through financial figures and 
addressed through the marketplace. Cat bonds are indicative of this trend as they 
transform environmental risks into financial figures and trade these risks through the 
market. Cat bonds are a form of environmental financialization in that they convert 
environmental risks grounded in space and time to an exchange value, which is separated 
from spatial and temporal realities. This thesis will refer primarily to Knox-Hayes’ 
(2013) definition of financialization as “the process of reducing value that is exchanged 
into financial instruments or derivatives of financial instruments” (p. 120).  
Catastrophe bonds divorce financial value from the material context they seek to 
represent. This process of converting environmental risk into exchange value creates 
distortions in the representation of climate change risk and value and could lead to 
undervaluation and mismanagement of environmental risks. The separation of exchange 
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value from the spatial and temporal realities of environmental problems creates 
distortions of value and fails to address the underlying problem (Knox-Hayes, 2013). 
Knox-Hayes (2013) refers to this process as time-space compression, defining it as “a 
process of privileging or converting physical space and time into social space and time. 
For valuation, time-space compression leads to the conversion of use values into 
exchange values” (p. 120). While finance literature and cat bond practitioners widely 
believe that cat bonds are useful risk management tools, the financialization of 
environmental risks can oversimplify material aspects of time and space. The 
financialization of environmental risks through catastrophe bonds can lead to the 
compression of temporal and spatial realities, resulting in mismanagement or 
undervaluation of risks.  
1.4 Significance and Contribution 
As discussed in the background section of this paper, cat bonds are seeing 
considerable growth and represent a significant portion of insurance risk management 
strategies. As the market continues to grow and cat bond investment becomes more 
common, there is a risk for investors to lose their money based on inadequate risk 
modelling and an undervaluation of the problem. Catastrophe bond critics have posed 
similarities between the risks of these bonds and the systemic financial risk that led to the 
sub-prime mortgages crisis (Phillips, 2015; Harrington, 2009). The European Insurance 
and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) expressed concern in the growth of the 
catastrophe bond market in their 2013 December financial stability report. They noted 
that fixed-income investors searching for yield may “not necessarily have the modelling 
capabilities and experience to fully analyse the underlying risks and complexity of the 
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insurance market”, which without adequate supervision “could cause systemic risk”  
(EIOPA, 2013, p. 16).  
With catastrophe bonds, there is also a risk for less climate change mitigation 
attempts if climate risk is considered a financial value that can simply be sold off. If 
insurance companies deem that by selling their risk to outside investors, they have 
accounted for it, there is an overt disconnect from the objective spatial and temporal 
aspects of natural catastrophes and their perceived value. The process of financialization 
creates this disconnect by transferring use value into exchange value. Climate change 
may become a more significant driver of the losses that cause cat bonds to trigger, which 
could lead to the source of a financial bubble.  
Cat bonds are representative of the broader inclination for environmental 
problems to be addressed through market mechanisms and financialization. By exposing 
the process of turning environmental risks into financial values, the limits of 
financialization as a method of addressing environmental problems can be revealed. 
Therefore, this research can be representative and informative of other forms of 
financialization of environmental problems such as carbon permit trading or weather 
derivatives. The overall contribution of this research will be to reveal the process of 
developing cat bonds in order to expose them as a form of financialization, while also 







1.5 Research Question and Objectives  
This thesis is guided by the following research objectives: 
• To map the infrastructure and networks of catastrophe bonds to evaluate their 
function (as a form of financialization) 
• To assess catastrophe bonds as a form of financialization through their decoupling 
of the spatial and temporal aspects of natural catastrophes 
• To contribute to critical literature on catastrophe bonds by examining 
financialization as a tool for addressing environmental risks 













2. Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a review of the existing literature surrounding catastrophe 
bonds and insurance risk management through the lens of financialization. In order to 
comprehend the existing literature on catastrophe bonds, it is important to examine 
alternative insurance risk management techniques as well. This literature review will look 
at existing literature on reinsurance and risk management in the insurance sector in 
addition to catastrophe bonds.  
First, a review of insurance risk management literature will be conducted in order 
to offer preliminary background knowledge on the purpose and state of the industry. The 
focus of this section of the literature review will be on typical insurance strategies such as 
reinsurance for managing risk in the industry. The implications of climate change on the 
insurance sector and risk management in the industry will then be discussed. To conclude 
this section, the convergence between insurance risk management and financial markets 
as it has been discussed in existing literature will also be reviewed. 
Following the analysis of risk management literature, existing literature on 
catastrophe bonds will be explored. Cat bonds will be compared to reinsurance as an 
alternative form of risk transfer for the industry. The purpose, development, and financial 
benefits of cat bonds will also be discussed in this section.  
After context has been provided through the previous sections, this chapter will 
then analyze the concept of financialization and time-space compression as the 
theoretical basis for this thesis. The concept of financialization and its societal effects will 
be described through existing literature. Then, the theory of time-space compression 
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through financialization will be analyzed and described through existing literature. This 
section of the literature review will offer the theoretical basis for a critique of catastrophe 
bonds. It will also describe the framework that will be used for the purpose of this thesis.  
Finally, a review of the critical literature surrounding catastrophe bonds and the 
broader financialization of environmental problems will conclude this chapter.  
2.2 Risk Management in the Insurance Industry 
 2.2.1 Risk Management and Reinsurance  
Risk management is an essential element of almost any business model and operation 
(Dorfman, 1998; Banks, 2004). Individuals, families, and businesses all face potential 
losses from natural disasters or accidents which could affect homes, places of business, or 
finances. Dorfman (1998) defines risk management as “the art and science of anticipating 
the potential losses and developing an efficient plan to survive them” (p. 2). Insurance 
arrangements are the primary source of risk financing (Dorfman, 1998; Banks, 2004). 
Banks (2004) notes that “traditional forms of risk management- loss control, loss 
financing and risk reduction, arranged through insurance mechanisms- have been actively 
used by companies for many decades, and are an essential element of most corporate 
strategies” (p. 3). As risk management is an integral part of the operations of any 
corporation, it is central to the security and success of the insurance industry itself that it 
develops its own risk management strategies (Carter, 1999; Banks, 2004).  
One of the central risk management strategies of the insurance sector has been 
reinsurance (Kramer, 1980; Carter, 1999; Patrik, 2006; Holland, 2009). Reinsurance is 
“legally an insurance contract; the reinsurer agrees to indemnify the ceding insurance 
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company, or cedant, for a specified share or specified types of insurance claims paid by 
the cedant for a single insurance policy or for a specified set of policies” (Patrik, 2006, 
p.1). Carter (1999) defines reinsurance as, “the insurance of contractual liabilities to pay 
claims incurred under contracts of direct insurance or reinsurance” (p. 5). More directly, 
reinsurance is indeed, insuring insurers (Kiln, 1981).  
Reinsurance has been practiced for centuries (Kramer, 1980; Holland, 2009). In 
1799, James Allen Park wrote, “Re-assurance, as understood by the law of England, may 
be said to be a contract, which the first insurer enters into, in order to relieve himself 
from those risks which he has incautiously undertaken, by throwing them upon other 
underwriters, who are called re-assurers” (p. 276). The modern global reinsurance 
industry developed in the 18th and 19th centuries (US Federal Insurance Office, 2014), 
with the first professional reinsurance company, Cologne Re, opening in 1846 (Holland, 
2009). Reinsurance is a key aspect of insurance risk management strategies to this day. 
For example, in 2011, more than half of $116 billion of insured catastrophe losses were 
assumed by reinsurers (Swiss Re, 2013).  
Reinsurance reduces the financial costs and risks of insurance companies and 
offers them a safety net (Patrik, 2006). By purchasing reinsurance, insurers limit their 
loss experience, increase their underwriting capacity, and are able to allocate their 
resources more efficiently (US Federal Insurance Office, 2014). In their 2012 report, the 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors identify the core business of reinsurers 
as “the reinsurance of peak risks originally assumed by primary insurers- i.e., risks with 
low probabilities of occurrence, but high severities” (p. 19). Purchasing reinsurance 
reduces the risk of bankruptcy for insurers by limiting their liability on particular risks, 
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protecting against catastrophes, stabilizing losses, and increasing capacity (Cummins, et 
al., 2008). Carter (1999) argues that reinsurance is not solely used to control retained 
claims costs, but is increasingly being used as a tool for financial management of insurers 
to manage their solvency margins, investment risks and tax liabilities.  
Despite all of the noted benefits that reinsurance provides for the insurance 
industry, the reinsurance market is limited in its ability to cover all insurance risks as a 
result of their volatile prices and limited capacity (Cummins & Weiss, 2009). The 
reinsurance underwriting cycle poses difficulties for insurers in predicting future costs 
and managing risks. Cummins and Weiss (2009) describe this troubling underwriting 
cycle as, “alternating periods of soft markets, when prices are relatively low and coverage 
is readily available, and hard markets, when prices are high and coverage supply is 
restricted” (p. 494). In hard markets, reinsurers’ capacity is reduced and the reinsurance 
prices rise, meanwhile, hard markets are generally when insurers have the greatest need 
for reinsurance (Cummins, et al., 2008). This transition to a hard market can aggravate 
insurers’ crisis and result in further susceptibility to risks (Berger, et al., 1992). During 
soft markets, some insurers view reinsurance as risk-free profit and take advantage of 
cheap reinsurance prices and overriding insurance commissions (Carter, 1999). Under 
these conditions, insurers are acting as “a broker under another guise” (Carter, 1999, p. 
11), as they are misrepresenting their coverage and leaving their policyholders reliant 
upon reinsurers, in addition to moral hazard issues (Carter, 1999). Moral hazard is 
defined as the “impact of insurance on the incentives to reduce risk” (Winter, 2000, p. 
155), or similarly the “lack of incentive to take care is called moral hazard” (Varian, 
2010, p. 724). Doherty and Smetters (2002) note that moral hazard risk increases in 
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intensity the greater the level of reinsurance. Based on these pricing, capacity, and moral 
hazard issues, reinsurance can be limited and pose problems for the insurance industry in 
their risk management strategies.  
 2.2.2 Climate Change and its Impacts on Insurance Risk Management 
As climate change becomes an increasing threat, insurance companies have begun to 
reanalyze their risk management strategies (Leggett, 1993). In 1993, Leggett noted that 
the insurance industry was beginning to wake up to the threats that climate change posed 
for the profitability of their industry. The paper hypothesized three possible options for 
risk management in the insurance industry. First, it can hope that climate change will be a 
passing fad and ignore it. Second, it can begin to drastically increase insurance prices and 
reappraise arrangements with reinsurers to find more realistic ratings for increasing 
threats. Or third, it can begin to look at strategic protection for the insurance market by 
lobbying for greenhouse gas emission cuts (Leggett, 1993).  
Most scholars would agree that the insurance industry has primarily chosen the 
second approach, by raising fees and considering alternative reinsurance agreements 
(Mills, 2007; Herweijer et al., 2009; Thistlethwaite & Wood, 2016). Mills (2005) argues, 
“insurers use traditional methods to reduce their exposures: increased premiums and 
deductibles, lowered limits, nonrenewals, and new exclusions” (p. 1042) and warns that 
treating climate change through these traditional measures will result in reduced 
willingness to pay and a shift away from the use of insurance. Herweijer et al., (2009) 
argue that the insurance industry’s response to climate change has not focused on 
incentivizing risk reduction or adaptation strategies. Aside from a few cases, the 
insurance industry has not yet developed meaningful relationships with policy makers in 
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order to promote adaptation strategies or deter housing or business developments in 
geographically exposed areas (Herweijer et al., 2009). Herweijer at al., determine that 
insurers have primarily turned to investment opportunities and underwriting in addressing 
climate change risks, rather than playing a role in adaptation. Mills (2005) notes that 
fewer than one in a hundred insurers appear to have seriously examined the business 
implications of climate change. Mills argues that, “disjointed modeling traditions and 
inconclusive attribution analyses hamper the industry’s ability to assess weather-related 
risks and regulators’ ability to safeguard both insurers and consumers” (p. 1043). 
Thistlethwaite and Wood (2016) found that despite the incentives for the insurance 
industry to meaningfully incorporate climate change into projections and decision-
making, there is insufficient evidence of any organizational change in the industry to 
address this.   
Leggett (1993) warned that the problem with addressing climate change through 
traditional methods, such as increasing premiums and reappraising reinsurance 
arrangements, was that pricing climate change risks would be problematic and near 
impossible. This is primarily because the past no longer provides a glimpse into the 
future of risks because of the rapidness of climate change (Leggett, 1993). Scholars 
confirm this prediction, demonstrating that the insurance sector continues to underprice 
risk and base it on past historical records of natural disasters and weather hazards 
(Herweijer et al., 2009; Thistlethwaite & Wood, 2016).  
Herweijer et al., (2009) argue that climate change poses a direct threat to the 
insurance industry as it undermines their financial stability. They maintain that the 
insurance industry’s traditional view of risk based on historical records of hazards can 
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lead to significant near-term threats as new climate threats may differ from those of the 
past. Thistlethwaite and Wood (2016) give light to this argument, demonstrating that the 
insurance sector has indeed failed to meaningfully integrate climate change risk into its 
underwriting and investment practices and corporate governance. They argue that climate 
change could lead to non-linear changes in the frequency and severity of insurance claims 
as the models insurers use to assess risk mostly focus on present risk rather than 
anticipating climate trends in the future. Mills (2007) argues that most insurers are behind 
the curve when it comes to developing new products or services in response to climate 
change, with most focusing on financial risk management.  
Many studies have been conducted which forward the business case for an 
incorporation of climate change adaptation and mitigation strategies into insurance 
practices. Herweijer et al., (2009) argue that adaptation to climate change is in the best 
interest of the commercial success of the insurance industry. They warn that if the 
industry does not incorporate climate change adaptation into its practices, the availability 
and affordability of private insurance will be threatened based on the insurability of risks. 
Kunreuther et al., (2013) further this warning through their analysis of the increased 
concentration of property and economic activity in hazard-prone areas, arguing that this 
concentration coupled with changes in climate patterns will restrict the affordability of 
insurance. In addition, increases in climate change disasters can lead to the risk of 
correlated losses, which could potentially bankrupt some insurance companies. Activities 
such as risk-based pricing, incentivized risk mitigation discounts and forming 
relationships with policy-makers offer reputational rewards and commercial success, 
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while also protecting the sustainability of the industry (Herweijer et al., 2009; Kunreuther 
et al., 2013).  
Mills (2007) argues that climate change poses a direct threat to the profitability of 
the insurance industry, noting, “the combined effect of increased losses, pressure on 
reserves, inflation of construction costs following natural disasters, and rising costs of 
risk capital result in a gradual increase in the number of years in which the industry is not 
profitable” (p. 1042). The insurance industry would benefit economically by reversing its 
destructive industry practice of underpricing future risks (Mills, 2007). Botzen and Van 
den Bergh (2008) argue that climate change poses severe economic issues for the 
viability of the insurance industry, while demonstrating how social welfare could 
improve through the insurance industry’s acknowledgement and action toward adapting 
to the risks posed by climate change.  
While there appears to be a clear business case for the insurance industry to 
incorporate adaptive strategies into its practices, there are other scholars who note that the 
insurance industry operates under a contradiction, arguing that while the industry does 
suffer from natural catastrophe losses, these losses also keep their business thriving and 
pose financial benefits (Sturm & Oh, 2010; Grove, 2012; Johnson, 2015; Lehtonen, 
2017). This argument will be further discussed in section 2.5.2 as an implication of 
financialization.  
As the reinsurance industry has limited capacity, the insurance industry required 
new strategies for managing extreme risks such as climate change. These needs were 
addressed through the capital market and a convergence of insurance risk management 
and the financial market. The following section discusses this convergence in more detail.  
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 2.2.3 Convergence of Insurance Risk Management and Financial Markets 
Palley (2007) notes that the principal impacts of financialization are, “to (1) elevate the 
significance of the financial sector relative to the real sector, (2) transfer income from the 
real sector to the financial sector, and (3) contribute to increased income inequality and 
wage stagnation” (p. 3). Insurance and reinsurance can be prime examples for this 
transferring of income from the real sector to the financial sector through their 
consolidation with capital markets (Amel et al., 2004; Cummins & Weiss, 2009) and their 
role as intermediaries between the public and the financial sector (Greenwood & 
Jovanovic, 1990).  
Over the past quarter century, there has been a convergence of the financial 
services industry and (re)insurance sectors, particularly in the property-liability insurance 
field (Cummins & Weiss, 2009). This convergence was driven by a number of factors, 
particularly, the growth in property values in areas prone to catastrophic risk, the volatile 
reinsurance underwriting cycle, and advances in communications and computing 
technologies, allowing for more accessible risk modelling and enhanced market 
transparency of risks (Cummins & Weiss, 2009). This convergence has led to the creation 
of hybrid insurance/financial instruments that combine financial contracts with 
reinsurance (Cummins & Weiss, 2009). While the primary method of risk transfer for 
insurers has been reinsurance (Kramer, 1980; Carter, 1999; Patrik, 2006; Holland, 2009), 
huge risks posed by natural catastrophes created a need for further risk coverage 
(Edesess, 2015; Cummins & Weiss, 2009).  
Inefficiencies in the reinsurance market are arguably the primary driver for the 
development of alternative risk transfer (ART) and the integration of capital market 
instruments (Nell & Richter, 2004; Cummins & Weiss, 2009). ART refers to contracts, 
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solutions or structures that enable firms to finance or transfer their exposed risks in a non-
traditional way (Culp, 2005). Culp (2005) describes ART as, “all about “convergence”- 
the convergence of capital markets and insurance, the convergence of corporate finance 
and risk management” (p. 1). ART allows insurers to transfer risks to another party or to 
capital market investors and receive financial protection against certain risks the 
transactions aim to cover (Artemis, 2017d). Hybrid ART products incorporate elements 
of financial instruments and reinsurance, and include products such as: finite reinsurance, 
sidecars, industry loss warranties, and multiple-trigger products (Cummins & Weiss, 
2009). These hybrid products extend the capacities of traditional reinsurance and 
demonstrate the beginning of a convergence between the insurance market and the 
financial market (Cummins & Weiss, 2009). However, as this convergence has continued 
to grow in success, the reinsurance aspect has been dissolved from some products, and 
new risk management tools have been developed which access capital markets directly 
(Cummins & Weiss, 2009). The primary and most successful capital market insurance 
instruments or insurance-linked securities (ILS), are catastrophe (cat) bonds, which will 






2.3 Catastrophe (Cat) Bonds 
 2.3.1 Purpose and Development 
As discussed in section 2.2.3, there has been a convergence of the financial market and 
insurance risk management of property liability (Cummins & Weiss, 2009). While 
reinsurers have typically covered insurance risk, risk sharing has now expanded past 
reinsurers, reaching to the global financial market (Phillips, 2014). Insurance-linked 
securities (ILS) are a type of ART in that they transfer particular risks to capital market 
investors. ILS are defined as, “financial instruments which are sold to investors whose 
value is affected by an insured loss event” (Artemis, 2017c). The most prominent type of 
ILS is the cat bond (Cummins, 2012; Panko, 2013; Nguyen & Lindenmeier, 2014), which 
is a fully collateralized financial instrument, which pays off on the occurrence of a 
particular catastrophic event (Cummins, 2012). Edesess (2015) explains that the purpose 
of cat bonds are to “crowd-source reinsurance coverage, in order to reduce reinsurers’, 
insurers’, and self-insurers’ reserve requirements and reduce their cost of coverage”      
(p. 1).  
Following severe natural disasters in the early 1990’s, a lack of financial capacity 
in the reinsurance market was generated, sparking the need for innovative products that 
could diversify insurance risk (Loubergé et al., 1999). Cat bonds allow for this 
diversification as they access the capital market directly and find reinsurance coverage 
through global investors. Phillips (2014) argues, “the only pool of cash large enough to 
underwrite such losses lies in capital markets- the collection of big investors like pension 
funds, hedge funds, and sovereign wealth funds that normally invest in stocks and bonds” 
(para. 4). While correlated losses in the billions could bankrupt insurers, or even 
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reinsurers, these extreme losses would hardly affect the global financial market (Phillips, 
2014), whose 2016 market capitalization was 68 trillion (World Bank, 2016).  
Cat bonds were developed in order to spread excess risks more widely among 
investors internationally (Loubergé et al., 1999). Nell and Richter (2004) argue the 
existence of cat bonds is owed to their ability to close the capacity gap of insurance 
supply and to address imperfections in the reinsurance market. The reinsurance 
underwriting cycle of alternating hard and soft markets created uncertainties in insurers 
seeking coverage in a period of unease over increasing natural catastrophe events (Nell & 
Richter, 2004; Cummins & Weiss, 2009; Edesess, 2015). Cat bonds “shelter the sponsor 
from cyclical price fluctuations in the reinsurance market” (Cummins 2012). They allow 
insurers to bypass the volatility and limited capacity of the reinsurance market and raise 
risk capital directly from the global market (Cummins, 2012).  
Unlike traditional reinsurance, which usually only provides coverage for a one 
year period, cat bonds can have multiyear protection (Cummins, 2012), generally up to 
three years (Phillips, 2014). While reinsurance runs the risk of defaulting, cat bonds are 
fully collateralized (Trottier & Son Lai, 2015). Cat bonds provide reinsurance coverage 
for ceding companies that traditional reinsurers often refuse to insure. “High layers” of 
reinsurance protection, or those events that have lower probability of occurrence and 
higher estimated damage losses, are often not covered by reinsurers (Cummins, 2012). 
Cummins (2012) argues that the reason these higher layers of protection often go without 
reinsurance is because, “1) for events of this magnitude, ceding insurers are more 
concerned about the credit risk of the reinsurer, and 2) high layers tend to have the 
highest reinsurance margins or pricing spreads above the expected loss” (p. 5). These 
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concerns do not apply to cat bonds as they are fully collateralized, thus eliminating credit 
risk concerns. In addition, cat bond pricing for high layer protection is often lower than 
reinsurance as the bonds are attractive to investors for diversification purposes 
(Cummins, 2012). In general, however, cat bond prices are competitive with traditional 
reinsurance as spreads are comparable to the cost of reinsurance for similar layers of 
coverage (Cummins, 2012).  
Cat bonds have also been noted to reduce moral hazard (Nell & Richter, 2004; 
Cummins, 2008). The payoff from cat bonds come from assets in a trust, therefore, “the 
bond sponsor retains a strong interest in the quality of the assets backing the bond” 
(Cummins, 2008, p. 5). In addition, in the case of index-triggered bonds, the pay-off from 
cat bonds can be based on an underlying stochastic which cannot be heavily influenced 
by the buyer, therefore reducing the risk of moral hazard. With traditional reinsurance, 
the insured can influence loss distributions (Nell & Richter, 2004). However, this finding 
is disputed in the literature, with other scholars arguing that moral hazard risk is 
significantly smaller for reinsurers as they are more easily able to monitor insurers as 
they generally have a relationship with the insurer, whereas cat bond investors have a 
much more limited ability for surveillance due to their having no personal or business 
relationship with insurers (Nguyen & Lindenmeier, 2014; Trottier & Son Lai, 2015). 
Cat bonds allow insurers to expand their underwriting capacities for catastrophe 
risks while offering high returns for investors and clear and unambiguous payment terms 
(Nguyen & Lindenmeier, 2012).  For insurers, cat bonds allow them to spread their risks 
throughout the marketplace, rather than solely depending on reinsurers (Loubergé et al., 
1999; Nell & Richter, 2004). For investors, cat bonds are attractive as they offer 
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diversification to their portfolio, they are uncorrelated to the broader financial market, 
and are fully collateralized (Cummins, 2008; Phillips, 2014). Cummins (2008) argues that 
cat bonds are innovative financial vehicles that have an increasingly important role to 
play in financing catastrophes due to their direct access to capital markets.  
Cat bonds have also been touted as an especially helpful tool for future use in 
developing countries through their ability to transfer catastrophe risk from government to 
the private sector (Phillips, 2014). Cat bonds can “give developing countries an 
opportunity to use financial mechanisms to proactively manage the risk of economic loss 
from extreme weather events through risk transfer” (Bennett & Smyth, 2016, p. 254). For 
example, in June 2014, the World Bank issued a catastrophe bond on behalf of a private 
climate risk insurance company, which covers some of the economic risks of earthquakes 
and tropical cyclones in sixteen Caribbean countries (Bennett & Smyth, 2016). This bond 
demonstrates the potential for cat bonds in the developing world as it could enable third 
world governments to transfer some of their economic risk to capital market investors 
globally (Bennett & Smyth, 2016).  
Cat bonds provide insurers with excess risk coverage as natural catastrophe risk 
continues to grow as a result of climate change (Van Aalst, 2006; López Vega et al., 
2015; Phalkey & Louis, 2016). These bonds address the limits of the reinsurance market 
and diversify insurance risk (Loubergé et al., 1999; Nell & Richter, 2004; Cummins, 
2012). Cat bonds allow insurers to expand their coverage while providing financial 
incentives for capital market investors (Cummins, 2008; Nguyen & Lindenmeier, 2012). 
The next section of this literature review will look at the popularity of cat bonds, their 
success in the market and predictions for future growth in the industry.  
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 2.3.2 Success and Future Outlook 
The cat bond market has become a steady source of capacity for insurers and reinsurers 
and has continued to see steady growth since 2009 (Cummins, 2008; Edesess, 2015). The 
outstanding cat bond market size at the end of the first-quarter of 2017 is $27.19 billion, 
the largest ever, with $2.76 billion issued in the first-quarter of 2017 (Artemis, 2017a). 
This marks the strongest opening quarter, in terms of new risk capital issued, since the 
inception of ILS approximately 20 years ago, and is the fourth first-quarter in a row to 
beat issuance records (Artemis, 2017a). The cat bond industry is very popular and 
continually gaining ground. In fact, in 2013, demand for the bonds even exceeded supply 
(Lewis, 2014; Edesess, 2015). The rates of return on cat bonds have averaged 7-9% 
annually since 2002 (Edesess, 2015). Cat bond defaults have been very rare, with only 
twelve defaults in total from 1990 to 2013, four of which were a result of the Lehman 
bankruptcy (Edesess, 2015).  
Although they have extremely poor credit ratings as a result of their high risk, cat 
bonds have become incredibly popular for investors (Phillips, 2014). They offer high 
rates of interest and permit investors to profit even at times of market decline due to their 
separation from the wider stock and bond markets (Phillips, 2014). Edesess (2015) argues 
that the reason the cat bond market is likely to remain very attractive to investors in the 
long-term is owed to the fact that the bonds are uncorrelated with the broader market,  
“namely the risk of equity market fluctuations, credit risk, and interest rate risk” (p. 7). 
As the risks of natural catastrophes are generally uncorrelated with risks in the economy, 
cat bonds allow investors to diversify the risk of their portfolios (Phillips, 2014; Edesess, 
2015). Cat bonds are one of very few assets investors can add to their portfolios that are 
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uncorrelated to the broader financial market, offering them significant diversification 
benefits (Lewis, 2014).  
Panko (2013) argues that what significantly sold investors on cat bonds was the 
financial crisis of 2008. While the financial market crashed, the cat bond market was 
stable and the prices stayed resilient (Panko, 2013). In addition, the liquidity of the cat 
bond market also allures investors, as they can easily trade the bonds through “live cat-
bond trading” in the event they may change their mind or get cold feet (Panko, 2013; 
Phillips, 2014). Panko (2013) and Lewis (2014) explain the success of the cat bond 
market as a result of the offer of compelling returns and transparency, especially with 
recent touted improvements in climate modelling. In addition, “cat bonds have only 
modest costs of acquisition, monitoring, and loss adjustment, which are usually quite 
considerable in insurance markets” (Nell & Richter, 2004, p. 185). This has also 
contributed to their popularity as an alternative to reinsurance.  
Although awareness of the risks that climate change poses for increases in natural 
catastrophes is growing, there have been few catastrophic events in the past decade 
(Phillips, 2014). This has allowed for losses on catastrophe bonds to be rare so far, thus 
increasing investor interest in the bonds (Phillips, 2014). Returns on cat bonds have 
continued to be high for investors and very few cat bonds have been triggered (Edesess, 
2015). Only 13 of over 400 cat bonds have reached their triggering events and required 
claims payments (Artemis, 2016b). Of these 13 bonds, only one resulted in a loss 
payment being delayed, while the remainder paid out in a timely manner, similar to 
payments made by traditional reinsurers (Artemis, 2016b). As the bonds are fully 
collateralized, insurers were able to receive their payments quickly and without issue, 
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thus increasing insurer confidence in the bonds as an alternative to reinsurance (Artemis, 
2016b). The increased use of indemnity triggers has also prompted increased confidence 
for insurers in cat bonds. As indexed cat bonds can result in imperfect risk allocation as 
they are based on variables not identical with the actual losses to be covered, insurers 
face basis risk, or a variance between the price of losses and the price of coverage (Nell 
& Richter, 2004). An indemnity trigger signifies that the bond pays out on the insurer’s 
actual loss, which is typically the same trigger type used for traditional reinsurance 
coverage. Through the increased use of indemnity triggers, calculations of basis risk are 
negated and insurers can feel sure of full losses being covered (Panko, 2013).  
The cat bond market is predicted to see increased growth in the coming years 
(Phillips, 2014; Edesess, 2015). Companies outside of the insurance realm as well as the 
public-sector have begun to become involved in the trading and issuing of cat bonds, with 
the New York Metropolitan Transit Authority and the Mexican government issuing their 
first cat bonds in the last few years (Phillips, 2014). While the majority of the cat bond 
market remains focused on the global north, the bonds are beginning to be investigated 
internationally and touted as a state solution for climate resilience in developing nations 
(Phillips, 2014). Experts have also considered Beijing as the next route for cat bond 
development based on their annual losses from extreme weather events (Phillips, 2014). 
Cummins (2012) argues that, “cat bonds make sound economic sense as a mechanism for 
funding mega-catastrophes” (p. 10) and predicts with certainty that the market will 
continue to grow, eventually seeing issuance in the public securities market rather than 
confinement to private placements.  
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Despite predictions for the future success of the market, the benefits of cat bonds 
are dependent on the accuracy with which environmental risks are modelled. The 
following section explores catastrophic risk modelling.  
 2.3.3 Catastrophe Risk Modelling  
Traditional insurance risk modelling follows a stochastic process where present or future 
risks are based on fluctuations observed in historical data (Daníelsson, 2002). Stochastic 
modelling attempts to reproduce possible scenarios or outcomes by randomly simulating 
numerous possible outcomes based on historical event data (Wild & Hockman, 2007). 
Ermoliev et al., (2000) explain, “traditional insurance operates on the assumption of 
independent, frequent, low-consequence (conventional) risks, such as car accidents, for 
which decisions on premiums, estimates of claims and probability of ruin can be 
calculated by using rich historical data” (p. 207). Classical stochastic modelling is 
strongly based on small and frequent events, rather than taking extreme-events into 
account (Embrechts & Schmidli, 1994). Ermoliev et al., (2000) argue that insurance runs 
on a “more-risks-are-better” (p. 208) approach, with more numbers of independent risks 
in insurance portfolios leading to lower variance of aggregate claims, lower premiums, 
and higher demands for insurance, increasing stability in the industry. Stochastic 
modelling allows for the forecasting of smaller and more frequent events, however, these 
stochastic risk models provide little guidance in times of crisis or catastrophe 
(Daníelsson, 2002).  
 Large catastrophic events such as the Northridge earthquake and Hurricane 
Andrew cost the insurance industry billions of dollars and illustrated the potential 
vulnerability the industry faced from potential major catastrophes (Cummins et al., 2002). 
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These rare catastrophic risks require new approaches to risk modelling in the insurance 
industry as “catastrophes produce heavy losses highly correlated in space and time, which 
depend on the clustering of regional values and on geographical patterns of catastrophes” 
(Ermoliev et al., 2000, p. 208). The “more-risks-are-better” strategy could increase the 
probability for insolvency for insurers as higher exposure to similar losses increase the 
risks of correlated losses based on catastrophes (Ermoliev et al., 2000). The time and 
space correlations of natural catastrophes call into question the use of stochastic 
modelling and emphasize the importance of new modelling tools “that account for the 
complexity implied by the manifold dependencies in the stochastic process of 
catastrophic events, decisions and losses” (Amendola et al., 2000, p. 381). Future 
potential losses at particular locations may be unlike anything experienced in the past, 
indicating the ineffectiveness that historical data provides for catastrophic risks and 
highlighting the issues with stochastic modelling in forecasting catastrophic losses 
(Ermoliev et al., 2000). Based on the limitations of stochastic modelling, “so-called 
catastrophe modeling is becoming increasingly important to insurance companies as they 
make decisions on catastrophe coverages, premiums, reinsurance agreements, and the 
effects of mitigation measures” (Ermoliev et al., 2000, p. 208).  
 In the late 1980’s, two separate developments for measuring catastrophes came 
together through catastrophe modelling. These two developments were mapping risk and 
measuring hazard (Grossi et al., 2005). Catastrophe models link the stochastic process of 
studying historical occurrences with new information technology, geographic information 
systems, and scientific studies of natural hazard measures (Grossi et al., 2005). As 
catastrophe modelling developed, three major modelling firms emerged, AIR Worldwide, 
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Risk Management Solutions (RMS), and EQECAT (Grossi et al., 2005). As insurers 
became more aware of their vulnerability to catastrophe risk, many began to turn to these 
catastrophe modellers for support in pricing their policies and determining the amount of 
coverage they should offer in hazard-prone areas (Grossi et al., 2005).  
 Catastrophe models are “essentially computer-based systems for measuring 
anticipated disaster losses, whose outputs are derived from various scientific 
assumptions. They do so by identifying and quantifying the likelihood of occurrence of 
specific events in a particular location and estimating the extent of potential losses” 
(Joyette et al., 2015, p. 473). Typical catastrophe models consist of four components: 
event module, hazard module, vulnerability or exposure module, and loss or financial 
module (Grossi et al., 2005; Joynette et al., 2015; Van Leer, 2015). The event module 
“incorporates data to generate thousands of stochastic, or representative, catastrophic 
events. Each kind of catastrophe has a method for calculating potential damages taking 
into account history, geography, geology” (Van Leer, 2015, para. 7). The hazard module 
determines the level of anticipated hazards, areas of occurrence, frequency and severity 
and, “characterises the risk of natural hazard phenomena and generates an estimate for 
each area within the affected location” (Joynette et al., 2015, p. 474). The vulnerability or 
exposure model assess the level of damage the hazard may have on insured properties 
(Joynette et al., 2015; Van Leer, 2015). Finally the loss or financial model translates the 
vulnerability or exposure model into estimates of monetary loss for the insurer (AIR 
Worldwide, 2012).  
 Catastrophe models are presented to insurers through model outputs by 
quantifying data and presenting it in a useful way to stakeholders (Grossi et al., 2005). 
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These metrics are used to inform insurance rates and underwriting guidelines, analyze 
existing policies, and help to make decisions regarding the purchase of reinsurance or cat 
bonds (AIR Worldwide, 2012). AIR Worldwide (2012) notes that catastrophe models do 
not determine insurance companies rates as catastrophe risk is only one input and does 
not account for operational expenses, profit margins, or other external factors. However, 
as cat bonds are created solely to cover catastrophe risks, catastrophe modelling is a 
crucial factor in pricing the bonds based on projected possible losses (Lane & Mahul, 
2008; Bodoff & Gan, 2009; Braun, 2014; PartnerRe, 2015). Braun (2014) argues that 
expected losses, which are determined through catastrophe models, are the most 
important factor in the pricing of cat bonds. Catastrophe modelling is continuing to grow 
in popularity within the insurance industry as awareness of the risks of climate change 
continues to grow (RMS, 2008) and as the cat bond market sees continued success 
(Edesess, 2015). Governments and maturing markets such as China and India have also 
begun to make use of catastrophe modelling as they recognize their catastrophe risks 







2.4 Theoretical Literature 
 2.4.1 Exploring Financialization Conceptually 
The origins of the term ‘financialization’ are unclear, although it began to appear 
frequently in the early 1990’s (Foster, 2007). Foster (2007) notes that the current usage of 
the term ‘financialization’ owes much to the work of Kevin Phillips, who devoted a 
chapter of the book, Arrogant Capital, to the ‘Financialization of America’, where he 
defined financialization as “a prolonged split between the divergent real and financial 
economies” (Phillips, 1994, p. 82). Figure 3 below illustrates this split by comparing 
banking assets with GDP and exposing a gross incongruity between the two.  
Financialization generally refers to the pervasive and growing role of finance in the 
economy (Epstein, 2005; Luo, 2017; Van der Zwan, 2014). Van der Zwan (2014) 
explores studies of financialization and argues that these studies “interrogate how an 
increasingly autonomous realm of global finance has altered the underlying logics of the 
industrial economy and the inner workings of democratic society” (p. 1). Financialization 
has been conceptualized as a new regime of accumulation, a guiding principle of 
corporate behaviour, and a central feature of everyday life (Van der Zwan, 2014). While 
capitalism has been largely associated with a trio of terms: neoliberalism, globalization, 
and financialization, the latter is often given the least attention, yet is increasingly seen as 







Figure 3: Development of GDP and Banking Assets  
 
(German Bundesbank, www.destatis.de).  
 
While there is no universal agreement on a particular definition of 
financialization, for the purpose of this thesis, I will be referring primarily to Knox-
Hayes’ (2013) definition of financialization as: 
“The process of reducing value that is exchanged into financial instruments or 
derivatives of financial instruments. Financialization is intended to accelerate the 
rate of profit accumulation from the exchange of financial instruments. As such, I 
conceptualize financialization as an extension of the conversion of use to 
exchange value in commodification” (p. 120).  
 
Knox-Hayes (2013) argues that financialization is a trend based on the increasing 
role of financial processes and actors in the economy and involves the process of making 
profit from financial channels rather than trade and commodity production. Over the 
years, there have been varying definitions and progressions in defining financialization. 
Knox-Hayes’ definition is a progression from other definitions, highlighting the transition 
from use value to exchange value. Krippner (2005) defines financialization as “a pattern 
of accumulation in which profits accrue primarily through financial channels rather than 
through trade and commodity production” (p. 175) and argues that financialization is the 
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key development in the US economy in recent decades. Epstein (2005) similarly defines 
financialization as “the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial 
actors, and financial institutions in the operation of domestic and international 
economies” (p. 3). Lapavitsas (2011) outlines the specific features of how 
financialization has affected and altered the behaviours of corporations, banks, and the 
individual. Through financialization, large corporations have reduced their reliance on 
banks, banking institutions have expanded their lending practices and mediating 
activities, and households and individuals have become increasingly involved in financial 
operations. In this sense, financial markets have transformed, spreading away from 
banking institutions and beginning to pervade all other aspects of society, including 
corporations and the individual. Lapavitsas posits financialization as a symptom of 
mature capitalist economies resulting in systemic transformation.  
Similarly, Davis (2009) argues that financialization has led to a transition from a 
society relying on organizations such as banks and large corporations, to a “portfolio 
society” (p. 40), where individuals are deeply connected to financial markets through the 
expansion of the retail sector of banking. Davis (2009) articulates this shift from the 
“organization man”, those whose worldview and lifestyle depended on their job, to the 
“investor”, those who buy and sell capital daily. Individuals no longer leave financial 
matters at the bank or at work, but rather, financial values pervade almost every aspect of 
their lives and decisions (Davis, 2009). Davis illustrates this transition through 
households, as home purchases are now considered investments, with buyers making 
their home decision based on future price increases. In another example, careers or 
educational decisions are now made based on future salary expectations and the state of 
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the market (Davis, 2009). Individuals are expected to act as investors and incorporate the 
financial market into their everyday decisions.  
The emergence of financialization in the economy is believed to be the result of a 
surplus in production that could not be absorbed by the economy, resulting in the slowing 
of capital accumulation (Luo, 2017; Magdoff & Foster, 2014). By expanding the 
financial sector and increasing capital through the rise of the elite, this economic surplus 
could be absorbed and the economy would be stimulated (Baran & Sweezy, 1966; 
Magdoff & Sweezy, 1983). However, this expansion of the financial sector has seen 
unparalleled growth, diminishing the importance of use value and increasing the 
importance of financial speculation and exchange value (Luo, 2017).  
In an article by Sawyer (2013), two common perspectives of financialization are 
evaluated in an attempt to distinguish between different meanings of the term. The first 
perspective relates financialization to the overall growth and expanding power of the 
financial sector throughout history, while the second looks at financialization as a 
specific modern stage of capitalism in which finance has become a dominant force. Luo 
(2017) couples the first conceptualization of financialization with neoclassical economics 
as these scholars tend to think of financialization as not exclusively occurring within 
capitalism, but rather, existing throughout all of human history. Luo also rejects the idea 
that financialization is a unique feature of capitalism, but rather, sees it as a result of 
changes in the monetary system and an embodiment of late modernity. In this article, 
financialization is conceptualized as an unintended consequence of the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods system and the transition from commodity money to credit money rather 
than a specific symptom of capitalism.  
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For the purposes of this thesis, whether or not financialization is a direct symptom of 
capitalism or a result of the growth of the financial sector is not at the heart of this 
definition. Similarly, this thesis will not focus on this debate or condemn capitalism as 
the driving force of financialization, but rather, it will consider financialization as the 
increasing role of financial institutions and motives and the diminishing importance of 
use value over exchange value.  
 2.4.2 Critics of the Impacts of Financialization  
The emergence of financialization has given rise to many critics. Opponents of 
financialization critique it from a variety of perspectives: arguing that it leads to 
economic collapse: it is a leading contributor to social inequality: or it is a significant 
factor in the devaluation of the natural environment. This section will provide an 
overview of the common critiques of financialization through an analysis of some 
normative, empirical and theoretical critical literature on the subject.   
 One of the major critiques of the financialization of the economy has been that it 
leads to systemic economic crisis. Following the 2008 financial crisis, these criticisms 
intensified. Arrighi (2007) identified financialization as the leading force of recession and 
depression in the economy. Financialization transforms the global economy by moving 
away from material accumulation and towards financial expansion. This financial 
expansion leads to crises of over-accumulation, resulting in increases in the amount of 
cash held by large corporations. At the same time, the expansion of the retail sector of the 
financial industry leads to increased credit lending and the accumulation of debt for the 
general population. This over-accumulation of businesses coupled with the increasing 
debt of the population leads to economic recession and crisis (Arrighi, 2007; Arrighi & 
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Silver, 2001). Plys (2014) also found that financialization is associated with and precedes 
financial crisis through the declining rate of profit which occurs in the financialized 
global economy. Financialization creates assets out of financial channels rather than raw 
material goods. This deters speculation and results in the unlimited creation of new asset 
streams (Leyshon & Thrift, 2007). This ability results in lenders creating new classes of 
assets and fuelling the expansion of debt through increased credit lending based on debt 
accumulation rather than earnings or increased income (Leyshon & Thrift, 2007; Davis & 
Kim, 2015).  
 This increased credit lending and debt accumulation has been considered a 
leading contributor to the subprime mortgage crisis that began in 2007. The unsustainable 
growth and expansion of the financialization of the economy based on unlimited asset 
creation and financial expansion led to a collapse of the market (Demyanyk & Van 
Hemert, 2011). This subprime market collapse is illustrative of the inherent problems of 
financialization, as rapid market growth and expansion of financial processes result in 
unlimited asset creation, lower underwriting standards, and debt accumulation 
(Demyanyk & Van Hemert, 2011). Davis (2010) argues that the mortgage meltdown was 
the result of the tie between the financial system and the general population,  
“The mortgage bubble was just one part of a broader shift in the economy toward 
a finance-centered system that ties the fates of households, businesses and 
governments to the vagaries of financial markets through the device of 
securitization- packaging capital assets (essentially any claim on future cash 
flows) into tradable securities” (p. 75).  
 
The subprime mortgage crisis demonstrates how financial systems pervade families and 
households, transforming the general public into investors and issuers (Davis, 2010). 
Through mortgages, credit loans, and insurance, the lives of the general public are 
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entangled in the financial system and households become investments. Financialization 
creates value out of future credits rather than commodities, blurring the boundary 
between real materials and financial assets (Luo, 2017). The growing influence of the 
financial system over every aspect of society creates misrepresentations of value and can 
lead to unsustainable growth and financial crisis (Davis, 2010; Leyshon & Thrift, 2007; 
Davis & Kim, 2015).  
 Financialization is also seen as a leading contributor of social inequality and 
polarization. Walks (2014) argues that financialization creates rising levels of household 
debt. It does so by transforming the citizen into the investor and engaging households in 
the financial market. Households are then encouraged to take on financial commitments 
by taking out mortgages and credit loans. The financial system’s pervading influence on 
the household has created an increase in the number of loans and debt (Walks, 2014). The 
distribution of household debt is regressive with respect to income and exacerbates class 
differences. Walks (2014) links financialization to driving debt levels by arguing that 
migrants or younger generations trying to enter the housing market are forced to take on 
significant debt in order to afford housing, which in turn, drives debt levels and further 
increases the price of housing. In this sense, financialization increases debt and income 
inequality, reproducing socio-spatial class relations (Walks, 2014). Davis and Kim (2015) 
also argue that financialization is a driving force for social inequality as it forces financial 
markets into areas where they were previously absent and pervades all aspects of social 
life. Financialization transforms debt into marketable securities, incentivizing lower 
underwriting standards and undervaluation (Davis & Kim, 2015). Financialization has 
resulted in a transformation of the population from savers to borrowers, with the lowest 
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class being forced to borrow most with the least sources for repayment (Hodson et al., 
2014).  
 A final critique of financialization, and the critique most relevant to this thesis 
research, involves the devaluation of use value that occurs in the financialization of the 
economy. Marx originally identified this devaluation through his formula of capital in 
which money is invested and profit is generated, eliminating the commodity step (Marx 
& Nicolaus, 1973). For Marx, capital meant converting use value into potential exchange 
value, thus diminishing the value of labour. Critics argue that financialization creates 
economic growth that is not grounded in real productivity growth (Bryan & Rafferty, 
2006; Leyshon & Thrift, 2007). In other words, through financialization, the potential 
exchange value is no longer representative of use value. Knox-Hayes (2013) expresses 
this view of financialization, arguing that it leads to the distortion of material values by 
abstracting commodities from their real space and time. Financialization treats future use 
value as present value. Knox-Hayes (2013) argues that, “financialization reduces material 
resources to financial exchange value and information, while simultaneously divorcing 
the resources from their materiality” (p. 120). As the importance of financial activities 
grows in society and drives profits, exchange value becomes more important and 
increasingly abstracted from use value (Knox-Hayes, 2013). Castree (2003) similarly 
argues that financialization can result in the physical and temporal materiality of natural 
systems being ignored through their evaluation in financial markets. Leyshon and Thrift 
(2007) critique financialization by arguing that it deters speculation, as it is entirely 
dependent on the constant search for new asset streams and makes it possible to use 
anything as a platform for financial activity. They argue that this process of transforming 
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anything into a financial representation compresses space and time representations. Thus, 
the real values which are supposed to be represented by exchange values have been 
abstracted to such an extent, that they are no longer representative (Leyshon & Thrift, 
2007; Bryan & Rafferty, 2006).   
 2.4.3 Time-space Compression 
The connection between financialization and a compression or misrepresentation of space 
and time dates back to 1989 with David Harvey’s time-space compression concept. This 
concept was used to refer to how capitalism and financialization have changed our 
relationship to time and space. Harvey (1989) argues that the acceleration of economic 
production and circulation of capital has led to a disassociation with spatial and temporal 
aspects and materiality. The rate that capital is moved around globally is accelerated to 
such a degree that it is almost non-existent, thus compressing temporal and spatial reality 
(Harvey, 1989). Harvey (1989) argues that capitalism has “annihilated space by time” (p. 
294) and that diminishing spatial barriers alter perspectives and exploit spatial 
differentiations.  
 Geographers have studied the concept of time-space compression as a result of 
globalization and the ‘shrinking world’ through transport technologies including physical 
transport such as trains or planes, and network transport such as the telephone or the 
Internet (Vance, 1986; Whitelegg, 1993; Brunn & Leinbach, 1991; Kirsch, 1995). 
Through these new technological advances, time and space are ‘collapsed’ or reimagined 




“Time-space compression subsumes not only physical movement through space 
and time, but also how people experience these dimensions symbolically, that is 
how people’s understandings of the world and their interactions over the earth’s 
surface are reconfigured, not simply one of measuring time or conquering 
distance but of the social construction of temporality and spatiality” (p. 148).  
 
This conception of time-space compression moves away from strictly geographical 
notions, and towards how conceptions of space and time are altered through the rapidity 
of the capitalist system and economics (Warf, 2011). As Harvey (1989) noted, capitalism 
faces an endemic problem of overproduction, and thus must constantly expand in order to 
deal with its endless accumulation. The endless search for new markets results in 
economic, political, social and cultural upheaval as time and space are continually 
destroyed and re-imagined (Warf, 2011). Warf argues, “in the context of contemporary 
capitalism and globalization, industrial capital has been largely supplanted by financial 
capital, with unprecedented spatial mobility. Financial capital’s ability to flow 
effortlessly across the globe gives it enormous abilities” (p. 150). The financial market 
dislocates places from their spatial elements, and instead, embeds places based on 
processes or activities (Warf, 2011). Warf gives the example of how “decisions made by 
financial managers in New York affect the lives of millions of people in locations as 
distant as East Asia” (p. 151). As these financial spaces are not evenly distributed across 
the Earth, these spatial complexities are more representative of the powerful, resulting in 
unevenly connected chains, which reinforce existing geographies of power (Warf, 2011).  
Knox-Hayes (2013) refers to time-space compression as the process of valuing 
social space and time over physical space and time. The increasing emphasis on exchange 
value over use value liberates the existence of value from present space and real time. 
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Financialization reduces material values into financial exchange values, thus removing 
these values from their spatial materiality.  
This connection between financialization and the compression of space and time 
will be a primary point of analysis for this thesis and offer a theoretical basis for the 
research on catastrophe bonds.  
 2.4.4 Conceptual Framework: Mechanisms of Financialization  
The conceptual framework that will be used in this thesis is derived from a concept by 
Castree (2003) and demonstrated by Knox-Hayes (2013). Castree identifies three 
mechanisms of financialization from the perspective of space and time: privatization 
through ownership, individuation through commensuration, and displacement through 
mobilization (Castree, 2003).  
 Privatization through ownership refers to how something is commodified through 
ownership and legal definition of credit. This first step in the process of financialization 
and commodification involves privatization, referring to “the assignation of legal title to a 
named individual, group or institution. The title gives more-or-less exclusive rights of the 
owner to dispose of that which is named by the title as they wish” (Castree, 2003, p. 279). 
Privatization is a precondition for commodification in that things cannot be exchanged 
unless they belong to different parties that are able to alienate them and use them for 
exchange. Castree (2003) argues that, “privatization is thus as much about control over 
commodities- prior to, during and after exchange- as it is about ownership in the 
technical, legalistic sense” (p 279).  
 Individuation through commensuration refers to the liquidity process, or the 
conversion of assets into cash. This second step in the process of financialization and 
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commodification involves the liquidity process, or the conversion of assets into cash. 
Castree (2003) describes this process as, “putting legal and material boundaries around 
phenomena so that they can be bought, sold and used by equally ‘bounded’ individuals, 
groups or institutions (like a firm)” (p. 280). Individuation is necessary for 
commodification as credits can only be exchanged if they are given a transferable value. 
This step of the financialization process involves transforming assets into credits that can 
be owned and traded. Knox-Hayes (2013) explains the commensuration process as it, 
“defines a metric of evaluation and simplifies the variables used to calculate the exchange 
value of the resource and equivalencies; this defines the standard” (p. 123).  
 Displacement through mobilization refers to the exchange process. In the case of 
cat bonds, this refers to the securitization and selling of the cat bond securities. This third 
stage in the process of financialization and commodification involves the process of 
exchange based on mobility. While resources are embedded to a specific time and place, 
transforming resources into a financial representation enhances their mobility. Knox-
Hayes (2013) explains, “mobility requires the conversion of the products from materials 
to information. The greater the extent that the product is composed of information the 
greater its reach or ability to be mobilized and accessed in different places and across 
time” (p. 125). In order to transform a product from material to information, it is 
represented by an electronic certificate that “can be accessed from the portals of traders 
all over the world” (Knox-Hayes, 2013, p. 125). In order for this to occur, there need to 
be market infrastructures that can connect and facilitate trades. This process of exchange 
through market infrastructures displaces resources from their real spatial and temporal 
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aspects and allows for “tremendous spatial and temporal mobility” (Knox-Hayes, 2013, 
p. 123).  
	  
 Figure 4 below illustrates this process of financialization through the three steps. I 
will use these three mechanisms of financialization as a framework for cat bond analysis 
in order to map the processes and actors involved under each mechanism. By analyzing 
cat bonds through each of these mechanisms, I will break down the actors and procedures 
involved in creating and selling cat bonds while exposing them as a form of 
financialization that enables time-space compression.  
 




























2.5 Critical Literature 
 2.5.1 Critiques of Catastrophe Bonds 
While the success and growth of the cat bond and ILS market is often viewed as a 
positive development for managing risk, there are many critics of these tools who doubt 
their ability to adequately address climate change risks, question their function on ethical 
grounds, or attribute their development to increased systemic risk.  
Duus-Otterström and Jagers (2011) take a normative stance against climate 
insurance tools such as cat bonds, arguing that the most vulnerable are those least likely 
to be insured through this system. They demonstrate that climate insurance tools leave the 
poorest, low-emitting countries responsible for paying the highest premiums based on 
their exposure to risk. The poorest regions are those most at risk for climate disasters, 
despite the fact that they have contributed least to climate change in terms of CO2 
emissions. Climate insurance tools leave these most vulnerable populations to pay the 
most for financial protection and result in innocent parties co-financing the costs of 
environmental risks that wealthy nations have imposed on them. Tools such as cat bonds 
are designed to transfer wealth from those most at risk to investors, usually in the North. 
If cat bonds begin to be used in developing nations to manage risk, their use would result 
in a transferring of wealth from the south to the north and further perpetuate wealth 
disparities.  
Phillips (2014) addresses concerns about cat bonds as a new source of systemic 
risk in the financial system. Much of the cat bond business operates out of offshore 
accounts in Bermuda or the Cayman Islands, as these areas are less strict regarding 
capital requirements and the disclosure of financial information. This leads to increased 
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concerns about a lack of transparency and the ability for investors to monitor their risk 
exposure. Insurance regulators, such as the European Insurance and Occupational 
Pensions Authority (EIOPA), have expressed concerns about underpricing catastrophe 
risk through cat bonds. If institutional investors continue to invest in the likelihood that 
catastrophic weather events will not occur, it will likely lead to a collective underpricing 
of these risks. Investors in cat bonds often have insufficient knowledge of climate change 
risks and are enticed by high returns without properly addressing their risks prior to 
investing. While investors in cat bonds believe they are receiving consistently high 
returns on these investments, by underpricing the risks of climate disasters, large sums of 
investments in these products could be lost unexpectedly. This type of loss could result in 
a ripple effect throughout the financial system and lead to crisis or a collapse of the 
market. Kolivakis (2013) expresses concern in the increased investment of pension funds 
in the cat bond market, arguing that this could result in systemic risk for the insurance 
industry. Kolivakis worries that pensions investing in cat bonds are underestimating the 
risks of natural disasters while creating problems for the insurance industry by drawing 
closer scrutiny from regulators. Global warming is resulting in an increase in natural 
disasters; however, cat bond investors may be underestimating these risks prior to 
investing.  
Joyette et al., (2015) identify issues in the field of catastrophe modelling and the 
pricing of cat bonds. They argue that the science of catastrophe models is highly 
uncertain and should be improved before users can apply it with any confidence. The 
complex, multidisciplinary nature of catastrophe models requires meteorologists, 
geologists, structural engineers, and actuaries to interact and collaborate to create these 
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models. Joyette et al., explain the issues with this collaboration as, “complicating the 
process are the assumptions underlying the models of each discipline, which contribute 
uncertainty to the process, and thus may affect the validity and reliability of the final 
outcome” (p. 480). Estimations of loss also pose critical valuation issues for risk 
modelling, with significant discrepancies between computed and modelled property 
values or losses. Deficiencies in data pose issues for projections, resulting in uncertainty 
of models. Hazard modelling uncertainty is a main issue for catastrophe modelling as it is 
nearly impossible to overcome and, “exists through errors in the input data, errors in 
observations used to validate a model, errors in model physics and scaling, short-duration 
datasets, especially when assessing event return periods, and changes in the environment” 
(p. 482). Joyette et al., maintain that data quality and model techniques need to see 
significant improvements before they can be applied and used for pricing with 
confidence. 
Critics of cat bonds have also argued that their usage results in increased exposure 
to moral hazard (Nguyen & Lindenmeier, 2014; Trottier & Son Lai, 2015). Nguyen and 
Lindenmeier (2014) argue that catastrophe bonds can result in moral hazard issues for 
insured agents. While it may seem that moral hazard would not be an issue in regard to 
catastrophe risk as the insured do not have control over catastrophic events and cannot 
increase probability of catastrophes based on their behaviour, cat bonds can influence 
insurer risks in other ways. Nguyen and Lindenmeier explain, “with the availability of 
insurance, the insured can act in a more risky manner, such as construction in more 
vulnerable regions or using dangerous technologies” (p. 80). Cat bonds can result in 
increased risky behaviour or less concern about catastrophic risks. Trottier and Son Lai 
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(2015) argue that cat bonds result in more exposure to moral hazard than traditional 
reinsurance. While traditional reinsurance usually consists of a beneficial business 
relationship between the insurer and the reinsurer, cat bond investors do not usually have 
any relationship to the insured. This relationship can reduce moral hazard, as reinsurers 
are able to monitor the insurer, while cat bond investors have a limited ability to monitor 
insurer behaviour. In addition, reinsurers and insurers can both benefit from a long-term 
business relationship, which establishes trust and makes the two affiliates in business. Cat 
bonds, on the other hand, do not require any relationship between the insured and 
investors, lowering surveillance abilities and reducing the incentive for insurers to avoid 
riskier behaviour. The fully collateralized structure of cat bonds also increases moral 
hazard risk while the credit vulnerability of the reinsurance sector reduces moral hazard.  
This literature review will now focus on critiques of financialization as it relates 
to cat bonds and their ability to address environmental problems.  
 2.5.2 Implications of Financialization for Insurance and the Environment 
The convergence of property-liability insurance and the capital market in dealing with 
natural catastrophe risk has been referred to as the “financialization of disaster 
management” (Grove, 2012, p. 140). Grove argues that this process is a clear illustration 
of financialization as it seeks to reorganize disaster management around the requirements 
of financial speculation. Disaster management is financialized, “through a process of 
appropriation and accumulation that transforms environmental insecurities into 
catastrophe risks that states leverage on financial markets to increase their adaptive 
capacity” (p. 141). Grove (2012) continues, “Financialized disaster management is not 
preoccupied with reducing a population’s existing vulnerabilities; instead, it speculatively 
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envisions and acts against potential threats disasters pose to capitalist order” (p. 141). By 
converging insurance with the capital market, future risks are imagined in ways that make 
the present profitable and environmental insecurities are transformed into marketable 
products (Grove, 2012). This approach to disaster management allows for the 
quantification, valuing, and commodification of adaptive capacity to catastrophe risks 
and transforms possible future threats into “an untapped reservoir of capital” (Grove, 
2012, p. 141).  
  Johnson (2015) similarly argues that this approach to disaster management makes 
modes of governing uncertain futures exchangeable and profitable in financial markets. 
Johnson argues that insurance offers a concrete example of Harvey’s concept of time-
space compression through its cycling of capital from financial markets into the built 
environment. There is an over accumulation of capital within the insurance industry, 
which is being further perpetuated through climate change risks. The industry relies on 
catastrophic losses in one year in order to earn extraordinary returns in the next as it can 
use scientific evidence of climate change in order to raise rates. There is a clear 
contradiction in the insurance industry as on the one hand, it offers protection and 
security to protect exchange value, but on the other, the services of the industry are only 
necessary as long as the physical environment continues to be devalued (Johnson, 2015). 
This point is furthered through Sturm and Oh’s 2010 paper, which demonstrates how the 
insurance industry profits from the increasing incidences of natural disasters through their 
spreading of risk and displacement arrangements. This advances the discussion of the ILS 
market as an illustration of moral hazard as the industry in fact benefits from increasing 
frequencies of natural disasters through raised premiums and spreading risks through the 
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financial markets (Sturm & Oh, 2010). Lehtonen (2017) expands this point by arguing 
that climate change in fact poses new kinds of opportunities for the insurance sector, “as 
regards the financialization of the biosphere on a planetary scale” (p. 33). Lehtonen 
argues that reinsurance objectifies weather related natural catastrophes, while 
simultaneously providing economic protection from them. Climate change is viewed as a 
strategic issue, “with the growing numbers of climate-change-related catastrophes and 
with ever more value at risk, such potential is also growing, and so is the market for 
insurance” (p. 42). Tools such as catastrophe bonds become objectifications of climate 
change, enhancing the value of insurance companies through their extraction of value 
from non-existing future events or uncertainties. Johnson (2015) highlights the limits of 
the belief that operations from the insurance market can help environmental adaptation 
efforts, and instead argues that it will more likely result in insurance only for the wealthy, 
leaving the state to manage less wealthy populations and areas.  
In a 2013 paper, Johnson sees the analysis and hedging of financial risks in the 
insurance industry as new patterns of accumulation and a clear representation of 
financialization. Johnson (2013) integrates ILS markets, in which the speculation of 
natural catastrophes constitute part of an accumulation strategy, with Smith’s (2007) idea 
of the “vertical integration of nature into capital” which entails, “not just the production 
of nature ‘all the way down’, but its simultaneous financialization ‘all the way up’” (p. 
33). Johnson (2013) notes that insurance risk management tools such as catastrophe 
bonds offer a prime lens for considering these hybrid techniques of capital accumulation 
in the insurance industry. Johnson (2013) examines the problems of catastrophe bonds 
and their exploitation of nature by exposing catastrophe modelling as a tool to create 
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contingent assets out of environmental and financial vulnerabilities. The article states that 
the “entire ILS apparatus further advances the financialization of both geophysical nature 
and life itself” (Johnson, 2013, p. 39). Johnson argues that ILS markets should be 
considered as an even more complete encompassment of labour and nature into capital.  
Based on these critiques, the financialization of insurance risk management could 
have potentially dangerous consequences for the environment. By exploiting 
environmental vulnerabilities in order to create economic gain, the need to physically 
address these risks is diminished. Addressing environmental risks through market 
mechanisms gives off the impression that actions are being taken to mitigate risks, 
however, in reality there are no physical changes in behaviour. The financialization of 
catastrophic risks requires further scrutiny as a result of the inability of market 
mechanisms to physically address environmental risks. The possible underestimation or 
inadequate modelling of environmental risks is also a source of concern when analyzing 
the financialization of insurance risk management.   
2.6 Research Question and Hypothesis Development 
 
While research on financialization, time-space compression, and insurance risk 
management is widespread, there has been limited research connecting these concepts, 
particularly regarding the cat bond market. This thesis research seeks to fill a gap in 
analyzing cat bonds from a critical financialization lens. The research aims to analyze cat 
bonds and expose them as a form of financialization enabling time-space compression. 
The theories of financialization and time-space compression will be connected with 
climate change risk management in the insurance industry through an in-depth analysis of 
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cat bonds. The research will contribute to critical literature on cat bonds by exposing this 
method of insurance risk management as a potentially dangerous tool for addressing 
environmental risks. 
 This literature review has informed the research objectives of this thesis while 
contributing to hypothesis development. The critical literature surrounding 
financialization and the diminishing of ‘use-value’ helps to illustrate the problems 
associated with cat bonds and their financialization of natural catastrophes. The theory of 
time-space compression helps to extend critiques of financialization by exposing how this 
process can separate material realities from their spatial and temporal aspects, rendering 
cat bonds as pure exchange values. Research on cat bonds to date has primarily focused 
on their structure, development, popularity, and what their usage means for the insurance 
and investment market. While there has been some significant critical literature on cat 
bonds, this thesis aims to extend these critiques by directly linking the bonds with the 
process of financialization. By mapping the infrastructure and networks of catastrophe 
bonds, their function as a form of financialization can be evaluated.  
The primary hypothesis for this research is that cat bonds are indeed a form of 
financialization enabling the compression of the temporal and spatial elements of natural 
catastrophes. The conceptual framework developed by Castree (2003) demonstrates the 
steps necessary in the financialization of natural phenomena. These steps are privatization 
through ownership, individuation through commensuration, and displacement through 
mobilization. By demonstrating that cat bonds exemplify each of these steps, they will be 




3.1 Introduction and Research Question 
This chapter presents the methodology used for conducting research for this thesis. The 
main objective of this study was to map the infrastructure and networks of catastrophe 
bonds in order to evaluate their function as a form of financialization. This objective 
represents an analytical approach called relational economic geography, “an approach 
that analyzes complex economic action and its localized consequences by focusing on the 
people, firms, institutions and other organizations involved in and subject to the 
consequences of economic decision-making” (Knox-Hayes, 2013, p. 118). The goal of 
this research has been to analyze cat bonds through the actors, processes, and 
infrastructure that contribute to their development and mobilization. 
In order to approach cat bonds through this lens, data on existing cat bonds was 
required in order to reveal these factors. The data used to analyze cat bonds was sourced 
from Artemis, an online publicly available database with a comprehensive deal directory 
of most of the cat bond transactions issued since the market’s inception in 1990. In 
collaboration with this data from Artemis, semi-structured interviews have also been 
conducted in order to assist in an interpretation of the data results.  
 To answer the primary research question for this thesis: How do catastrophe 
bonds represent a form of financialization that uses time-space compression?, this thesis 
follows an explanatory sequential mixed method approach. The first research stage was 
to gain an understanding of the typical processes, actors, and structure of cat bonds by 
mapping the key factors involved in each transaction. The second stage was to clarify 
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complexities and deepen the understanding of cat bonds by interviewing key informants 
including experts and traders. 
 The subsequent sections of this chapter will detail the exact procedures used in 
conducting research on this topic. First, a general description and justification of the 
methodology will be explained. Secondly, a more in-depth description of the exact 
quantitative design including data collection and analysis techniques will be described. 
Next, the qualitative design including participant selection, interview questions, and 
analysis techniques will be explained. Finally, credibility concerns and limitations or 
boundaries will be addressed in order to conclude this section.  
3.2 Research Design 
 This study employed a deductive approach, meaning, “an approach to inquiry that begins 
with the statement of a theory from which hypotheses may be derived and tested” 
(Bryman et al., 2012). As this research is testing the theory of financialization enabling 
time-space compression through cat bonds, it is deducing a specific hypothesis from an 
existing theory rather than contributing to the development of new theory. Following data 
analysis and interpretation, the hypothesis that cat bonds are a form of financialization 
enabling time-space compression will either be accepted or disputed. Thus, the chosen 
theoretical framework would be supported through the acceptance of the hypothesis.  
 The thesis research follows a mixed method design. A mixed method approach is 
a methodology for conducting research that involves the collection and integration of 
quantitative and qualitative research and data in a study (Creswell, 2014). Based on the 
deductive nature of this research, this study employed an explanatory sequential mixed 
method approach. This approach involves two-phases, beginning with the collection and 
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analysis of quantitative data, followed by the collection and analysis of qualitative data 
(Creswell, 2014). Creswell explains, “the overall intent of this design is to have the 
qualitative data help explain in more detail the initial quantitative results” (p. 224). This 
approach was chosen as the topic in question can be difficult to understand without 
expertise in the industry. As the quantitative data was the most comprehensive source of 
information of the cat bond industry, it was chosen as the primary source of data. 
However, qualitative data was included in order to help clarify the quantitative findings 
and explain any complexities or misinterpretations.  
The research approach began with the collection of data from the Artemis cat 
bond deal directory. This data was exported onto Excel, organized, and then analyzed. 
The specific details of the quantitative data collection and analysis will be discussed in 
the next section of this chapter. Following an initial analysis of trends and key factors in 
the quantitative data, qualitative semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders in the 
industry were conducted. The quantitative analysis helped to inform the interview 
questions based on areas of interest or in need of further clarification. More details on the 
specifics of the qualitative data collection and analysis will be discussed later in the 
chapter.  
A mixed method approach was chosen for this study in order to offer the most 
convincing and accurate results possible. Many scholars have demonstrated that 
quantitative and qualitative methods complement each other and when used in 
combination, allow for a more robust and valuable analysis (Green et al., 1989; Miles & 
Huberman, 1994; Green & Caracelli, 1997; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998; Ivankova et al., 
2006). Explanatory sequential mixed methods were chosen as the design for this research 
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based on the need for further explanation and clarification of quantitative results in order 
to enhance the reliability of the data. Krohwinkel (2015) argues that explanatory 
sequential mixed method designs, “can serve the dual role of confirming and elaborating 
findings, allowing for a more refined understanding of interactions among factors that 
would not have been achieved with the use of any one of the analysis techniques alone” 
(p. 336). In Krohwinkel’s 2015 study of organizational project delays, explanatory 
sequential mixed methods were used based on their ability to single out explanatory 
variables for project delays through quantitative data while also explaining nuances, such 
as the particular reasons for delays, through qualitative data. Krohwinkel (2015) claims, 
“this study utilized the strengths of each method, using the quantitative phase to locate 
significant explanatory variables across the sample, and the qualitative phase to nuance 
these findings by demonstrating differences in how variables combine” (p. 351).  
This study employs explanatory sequential mixed methods for the same purposes 
as Krohwinkel. While the quantitative data provides a comprehensive source of 
information on cat bond transactions, indicating significant trends, themes and variables, 
the qualitative data can help to discern nuances and explain the complexities of a 
complicated topic to a researcher that is not an expert in the field. The qualitative results 
can greatly aid in exploring statistical results in more depth (Ivankova et al., 2006). The 
following section of this chapter will detail the exact steps taken in collecting and 






3.3 Phase One: Quantitative Design 
 3.3.1 Data Selection  
This research used the Artemis Catastrophe Bond and Insurance-Linked Securities Deal 
Directory as its primary source of data. This dataset is publicly available and free to 
access. In studying cat bonds, it was incredibly fortunate that this comprehensive 
database was available for use. The Artemis database details 472 cat bond transactions, 
starting in 1996. This database contains details about most of the cat bond transactions 
issued since the creation of the ILS market in the mid 1990’s. The transactions that are 
included in the database give details on: issuer/SPV, cedent/sponsor, 
placement/structuring agents, risk modelling/calculation agents, risks/perils covered, size, 
trigger type, ratings, and date of issue, with some exceptions based on undisclosed 
information or sources.   
 This dataset was chosen for this research as it offered the most comprehensive 
and relevant information on cat bonds. The primary objective of this research was to map 
the infrastructure and networks of catastrophe bonds in order to evaluate their function as 
a form of financialization. In order to accomplish this, it was necessary to gain an 
understanding of the typical processes, actors, and structure of cat bonds by discovering 
the key factors involved in each transaction. The Artemis database provided all of the 
relevant factors involved in the development of a cat bond and offered the opportunity for 
longitudinal analysis of the topic. In this case, the use of this secondary data source 
allowed for longitudinal analysis beginning in 1996, meaning that trends from over two 
decades could be charted and analyzed (Bryman et al., 2012).  
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 In addition to the advantage of longitudinal analysis, the use of secondary analysis 
can offer other benefits for researchers. Using secondary data allows for high-quality 
information while being less costly and timely for the researcher (Bryman et al., 2012). 
By using the Artemis database, detailed data could be exported and analyzed efficiently. 
As the data was already collected and available, this allowed for more time focused 
solely on data analysis and interpretation (Bryman et al., 2012). The Artemis data also 
allowed for international analysis, rather than being constricted to North America. As 
Artemis collects cat bond data globally, the use of this database allowed for significant 
global geographic analysis of the cat bond market.  
 3.3.2 Data Collection Process 
Based on the objectives of this research, data was retrieved from the Artemis database 
and manually exported into an Excel spreadsheet. All cat bond transactions were included 
in the data that was exported, which amounted to a total of 472. There was no sampling 
used for the purposes of this research, allowing all transactions to be included in the 
analysis. Any recent transactions on the database were also manually exported up until 
the end of the data collection process on June 1st, 2017. This date was chosen to end data 
collection because data analysis was to begin following this date. In addition, there 
appeared to be no new trends in the most recent transactions, with similar factors 
continuing to be reflected in the newer transactions as seen in prior transactions. Bryman 
et al., (2012) refer to this concept as data saturation, meaning “the point at which there is 
nothing to be gained by further reviewing of old data or collection of new information to 
see how it fits with emerging concepts or categories; new data are no longer illuminating” 
(p. 259). The decision was made to end the data collection process on June 1st, 2017 
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because new trends and concepts were no longer appearing and the process of data 
analysis needed to begin. Based on the decision to include all Artemis transaction data in 
the analysis, the data and findings from this research are representative of cumulative 
growth and trends in the industry, rather than simply studying the outstanding market.  
 All listed factors were included in the exportation of the data including: 
issuer/SPV, cedent/sponsor, placement/structuring agent(s), risk modelling/calculation 
agent(s), risks/perils covered, size, trigger type, ratings and date of issue. Table 1 
provides descriptions of these data items. The transactions were organized by date, as 
they are presented on Artemis, and each factor was given a column. Any missing data 
were represented with a question mark. All information was manually copied onto Excel 















Table 1: Data Items and Descriptions 
Data Item Description 
Issuer/SPV The issuing vehicle of the bond, usually a 
subsidiary company created for the 
purpose of the transaction  
Cedent/Sponsor The sponsoring company, i.e. the insurer, 
reinsurer, or organization from who the 
risk comes from 
Placement/Structuring Agent(s) The brokers, broker dealers, or book-
runners who arrange and facilitate a 
transaction 
Risk Modelling/Calculation Agent(s) The organization that estimates possible 
losses through risk modelling analysis 
and contributes to the structuring and 
pricing of catastrophe bonds 
Risks/Perils Covered The location and natural catastrophe risk 
that the bond provides coverage for 
Size The price of the catastrophe bond 
Trigger Type The event that will trigger the payout of 
the catastrophe bond, 4 most common 
types: 
Indemnity: covers actual excess claims or 
losses of the issuer 
Industry loss: coverage based on whole 
industry losses of the event 
Parametric: coverage based on exceeding 
of specified natural parameters 
Modelled: coverage based on claims 
estimated by a computer model 
(Edesess, 2015).  
Ratings The investment rating of the catastrophe 
bond  
Date of Issue The month and year the catastrophe bond 
was issued  
 
3.3.3 Data Cleaning and Organization 
Several steps were taken in order to make the data functional for analysis and 
comparison. The factors that were included in the cat bond analyses were sorted and 
analyzed from two perspectives, their respective dollar value and the number of bonds 
issued. In order to analyze the data from these perspectives, the values had to be 
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comparable. In the original dataset, the dollar values of the catastrophe bonds were 
represented in various currencies. Therefore, in order for a workable comparison between 
factors based on values, all dollar values were converted to USD based on the exchange 
rate on May 15th, 2017. See Table 2 below for a list of the exchange rates used for the 
conversion to USD. Once all the values had been converted, the bonds could be broken 
down and analyzed through comparable valuations.  
Table 2: Exchange Rates  
Currency Exchange Rate US Dollar Value 
1 Euro 1.0978 1.1 USD 
1 CAD 0.73353 0.74 USD 
1 CHF 1.004 1 USD 
1 DEM 0.55868 0.56 USD 
Sourced from: Exchange-Rates.org on May 15th, 2017.  
  
 Further data cleaning techniques were used in order to merge data in separate 
analysis categories. In order to evaluate the location of the cat bonds, the information 
under “risks/perils covered” from the raw dataset was separated. As data under the 
category of risks provided information about the specific risks covered and the location 
of the risks covered, this data was separated so that location could be analyzed as its own 
factor. Thus, the information under risks was divided into two separate columns; location 
and risk type. Location data was then further categorized by dividing data based on 
continent. The categories included were North America, Europe, Asia, South/Latin 
America, Australia, Worldwide and Unknown. Data was merged by sorting countries 
based on their continent. Some decisions based on continent classification require further 
clarification. Any bonds covering risks in Turkey or the Mediterranean were placed under 
Europe (rather than Asia). Mexico, Puerto Rico, Caribbean and Central America were 
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included as South/Latin America. While these countries are sometimes considered part of 
North America, the decision was made to group them separately as it would result in a 
more accurate reflection of the economic conditions of particular regions that have higher 
catastrophe bond issuance. These areas have very different economic, political and 
cultural conditions than North America. Therefore, for research purposes, more 
informative and representative analysis could be gained by grouping these countries 
separately.  
 Where some bonds provided coverage that spanned more than one continent, 
these values were represented more than once for each respective continent they provided 
coverage for. For example, one bond provided coverage for the United States, Canada, 
Europe and Australia. This bond was represented fully in three different continent 
categories: North America, Europe and Australia. The dollar value was represented fully 
in each category, therefore, in the location section of analysis, the final figures would add 
up to more than the actual cumulative issuance of the bonds. The decision to represent 
these types of bonds under each category was made so that each continent could be 
accurately reflected as holding a particular percentage of the cat bond market. Rather than 
having a large worldwide category, which would lack granularity, it was decided that 
representing the bonds within each continent category they provided any coverage for 
would result in a more accurate depiction of where the cat bond market provided the most 
coverage.  
 Following the separation of risks from their location details, the risks were 
merged based on specific categories. The categories of risks included were: multi-peril, 
windstorm, earthquake, extreme/excess mortality, named storms, temperature risks, 
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operational risk, property catastrophe risk, mortgage insurance risks, life embedded 
value, lottery winning risk, typhoon, hurricane, healthcare, motor, thunderstorm and 
unknown. Any bonds that covered more than one risk type were placed under the multi-
peril category. Bonds labelled extreme mortality or excess mortality were placed under 
the same inclusive category. Casualty losses, credit reinsurance, event cancellation and 
operational risks were merged under the category of operational risk. Longevity risk, life 
insurance mortality and life reinsurance were merged under the category of life 
embedded value. Motor liability losses and motor policies were merged under the 
category motor risk. And finally, medical benefit claims levels were placed under the 
healthcare risk category.  
 In order to evaluate risk modellers, data under the same risk modelling companies 
were merged. Where information on the reporting agency and the calculation/reset agent 
were both provided, the calculation/reset agent information was represented rather than 
the reporting agency information. As the topic of interest is catastrophe risk modelling, 
reporting agents are typically accounting services and are not involved in risk modelling 
procedures. The calculation/reset agents are those that provide risk-modelling services 
and are more relevant to the required data information. Trigger types were also merged 
under specific categories. These categories were indemnity, industry loss, medical benefit 
ratio, modelled loss, parametric, mortality index, multiple triggers and unknown. Any 
data that listed more than one trigger type were placed under the multiple triggers 
category. In all cases, any data that was missing information was placed under an 
unknown category and represented in the final data set numbers as unknown.  
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3.3.4 Data Analysis  
Based on the relational economic geographical approach of this research, the focus of 
analyzing the dataset was to evaluate how each specific factor was represented and 
affected the cat bond market. Therefore, by dividing the data based on each specific 
factor along with their corresponding dollar values and the number of bonds issued, each 
factor could be analyzed based on how often it was represented in cat bond transactions. 
For each specific factor: cedent/sponsor, placement/structuring agent(s), risk 
modelling/calculation agent(s), risks/perils covered, location, trigger type, and rating, a 
separate Excel worksheet was created. For each bond, every specific factor was copied 
onto a separate datasheet from the original dataset along with the value of that bond. Each 
bond was labeled by factor and the number of the bond based on the date of issuance (#1 
to #472) along with the dollar value.  
Pivot tables on Excel were used in order to combine, sort and count the data based 
on the specified factor. A pivot table is a data processing tool that aids in data analysis by 
counting, sorting, totalling or otherwise organizing large datasets. Jelen (2010) argues, 
“pivot tables are a powerful tool for turning thousands of records of detail data into a 
concise summary in a few clicks” (p. 54). By utilizing pivot tables, the data could be 
sorted and the sum of specific factors could be totalled. The bonds were grouped together 
and dollar values or the numbers of bonds issued were combined based on whichever 
factor was being analyzed. For example, for trigger type, all bonds under the indemnity 
trigger were grouped together and the total values and number of bonds under that 
specific trigger type were added.  
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Using pivot tables, the Row Labels and Value field were utilized. The Row 
Labels section filters data based on a specified factor. The Values field sorts data based 
on total sums or a count of each row label. The specific factor that was being analyzed 
was dragged into the Row Labels field and the total dollar value and the numbers of 
bonds issued were dragged into the Values field. The values field was changed to “sum 
of”, ensuring that it would add up all of the same Row Labels fields. This would group all 
of the same factors into one field and add up the total dollar value and number of bonds 
issued under this specific factor. After pivot tables were generated, the data could be 
sorted from largest to smallest through an Excel function. This would give a concise list 
of each factor’s representation in the cat bond market by showing the total value of the 
market that each specific factor had while also showing how many of the total bonds 
issued fell into each factor’s category. Through Excel, charts could then be generated 
which would indicate the percentage of the market each factor had based on either values 
(in millions USD) or the number of bonds issued.  
Following the quantitative data collection and analysis process, qualitative 
research was collected and analyzed. The next section of this chapter details the methods 
taken in the design, collection and analysis of the qualitative data used for this research.  
3.4 Phase Two: Qualitative Design 
Given the complexity of this topic, it was decided that qualitative interviews should be 
conducted following quantitative data analysis. Secondary data analysis poses some 
limitations for researchers. When researchers employ secondary data analysis as the 
primary source of data collection, they can be limited by the complexity of the data and a 
lack of familiarly with the data (Bryman et al., 2012). In order to overcome these 
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limitations by ensuring the quantitative data was not misrepresented or understood 
incorrectly, semi-structured interviews with industry experts were conducted as a follow 
up to quantitative data analysis. These interviews also aimed to further explain the 
development of cat bonds while offering the potential for expert critical opinions.  
 3.4.1 Participant Selection 
In order to select participants for the study, convenience sampling was used to recruit 
candidates. Based on the small number of industry experts in the field, only three 
interviews were conducted. While three interviews may seem to be a small sample size, 
the cat bond industry has very few companies and experts, thus, three qualified experts in 
the field offered adequate and representative data. With a high degree of agreement 
between participant responses, I was confident that the point of theoretical saturation had 
been reached and additional participants would not have yielded new information to the 
study. Marshall (1996) explains that small samples can be most effective for qualitative 
research and can offer improved understandings of complex issues that are more 
important than generalizability of results. However, in this case, as the industry being 
studied is so small and experts in the field have been chosen, this sample size can be 
generalizable for the industry.  
Convenience sampling was used to recruit participants based on members of the 
thesis committee’s contacts. However, these participants were not recruited without a 
thoughtful analysis of how they could contribute to the research. In this sense, it may be 
more accurate to refer to the sampling method as a judgement or purposeful sample. 
Marshall (1996) described a judgement or purposeful sample as, “the researcher actively 
selects the most productive sample to answer the research question” (p. 523). By working 
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closely with the thesis committee and discussing the best candidates for the interviews, it 
was decided that based on the committee’s connections, they could recruit key actors in 
the industry that would offer extensive and qualified expertise of the topic. The 
participants were included in the study based on their expert roles in the development and 
mobilization of cat bonds. All participants included in the study are qualified experts in 
the field of ILS, and have years of experience in the industry of cat bonds. These key 
stakeholders offer insight and a richer understanding of the data through their expertise 
(Marshall, 1996).  
The participants were invited to participate in the study by email. In one case, 
based on the connection the committee members had with one of the possible 
participants, they contacted them first. For the other two interviews, I contacted them 
directly via email. A recruitment email was sent out to the informants offering a brief 
description of the project and inviting the participant for an interview either in person, on 
Skype, or by telephone. In total, six interview requests were sent out, with three 
responses. After receiving a response expressing interest in the study, I reached out to 
them with a second email, detailing the purpose of the thesis research and arranging a 
convenient time and format for the interview. Informants were assured confidentiality 
and informed of their legal rights to terminate their participation at any time. They were 
also asked to review a consent form approved by the University of Waterloo’s Office of 
Research Ethics and provide their informed consent to participate over email. Participants 
were assured their identities would be kept anonymous and not revealed in the study 
unless they elected to waive their anonymity. Participants were informed the interviews 
would take between 45 to 60 minutes.  
66	  
	  
 3.4.2 Interview Questions and Procedures 
Based on the explanatory purpose of the qualitative interviews, in-depth semi-structured 
interviews were chosen as the method for qualitative data collection. Drever (1995) 
describes semi-structured interviews as,  
 “The interviewer sets up a general structure by deciding in advance the ground to 
 be covered and the main questions to be asked. The detailed structure is left to be 
 worked out during the interview, and the person being interviewed has a fair 
 degree of freedom in what to talk about, how much to say, and how to express it” 
 (p. 1).  
 
By employing a semi-structured interview method, the researcher is able to create a set of 
predetermined questions to aid in structuring and focusing the interview, however, the 
open-ended nature of the questions allows participants to answer them freely. Bryman et 
al., (2012) view semi-structured interview questions as a guide for the interviewer that 
can help to lead them into an in-depth conversation with the participant. Drever (1995) 
considers semi-structured interviews to be a flexible and appropriate method for small-
scale, in-depth research.  
 The primary objective of this research was to evaluate catastrophe bonds as a 
form of financialization by mapping the infrastructure and networks involved in their 
creation and distribution. In order to accomplish this objective, in-depth knowledge of the 
typical processes and actors in the industry was needed. Although the Artemis database 
provided a comprehensive source of information of the cat bond industry, the complexity 
of this industry can cause difficulties or misunderstandings in its analysis. The purpose of 
the qualitative interviews was to help to clarify the quantitative findings and offer 
personal, nuanced understandings of the market from top experts in the field. Semi-
structured interviews were the most suitable method for providing focused and detailed 
information and opinions from industry experts to help in clarifying an understanding of 
67	  
	  
the topic. Semi-structured interviews allowed for detail and focus, while also accounting 
for the complexities of the topic and allowing participants to provide detailed, complex 
information. They also granted the participant the freedom to highlight other important 
topics that may have not been included in the original questions.  
 The interview questions were informed based on initial findings from the 
quantitative data analysis. They were developed in order to provide more information on 
areas of interest or in need of further explanation. The questions were submitted to the 
University Ethics Office and received their approval under ORE #22203.  The questions 
remained the same for all three interviews, but were presented in a slightly different order 
than shown in Appendix A, based on how the conversation progressed.  
 The interviews were conducted in late May and early June 2017. As all three 
participants were based outside of Canada, interviews did not take place in person. The 
first interview took place over Skype while the other two interviews were conducted 
through a conference call system. The interviews lasted between 40 to 45 minutes in 
total. All three interviews were recorded and manually transcribed afterwards. Each 
interview was approximately 1600 words in total after transcription.  
 3.4.3 Interview Analysis 
The interview transcripts were analyzed deductively based on the fact that the research 
aimed to accept or refute an existing theory. The primary goal of the qualitative data was 
to help explain and clarify quantitative data results while also offering expert opinions. In 
this sense, the analysis was deductive as the aim was to use the interview results to 
support the quantitative results and in turn, support the hypothesis. The data was 
interpreted following a qualitative descriptive design. Sandelowski (2000) describes 
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qualitative descriptive studies as, “[they] offer a comprehensive summary of an event in 
everyday terms of those events” (p. 336). Qualitative descriptive studies aim to accurately 
account events descriptively and view “language as a vehicle of communication, not 
itself an interpretive structure that must be read” (Sandelowski, 2000, p. 336). By using a 
qualitative descriptive approach to analysis, the surface meaning of the words and 
descriptions used in the interviews remained of primary importance. Sandelowski (2000) 
explains, “the qualitative descriptive study is the method of choice when straight 
descriptions of phenomena are desired. Such study is especially useful for researchers 
wanting to know the who, what, and where of events” (p. 339). As the primary goal of 
this research is to map the who, what and where in the development of cat bonds, a 
qualitative descriptive approach to analysis was the most suitable. The approach offers a 
primary lens for comprehensively explaining qualitative findings and using them to 
explain quantitative results.  
 As the quantitative data was used to inform the qualitative interview questions, 
the order of these questions helped to group data prior to analysis. The intended 
framework mentioned in section 2.2.4, the mechanisms of financialization, also informed 
the interview questions. By grouping the questions into the framework categories and 
sub-categories prior to conducting the interviews, the analysis was made sufficiently 
easier and more productive. In analyzing the transcripts, framework analysis was used by 
sorting the data into categories based on which part of the framework they belonged to. 
Each question that was asked of participants already belonged to a particular section of 
the framework; therefore, the data could be categorized into relevant framework 
categories based on the question. Srivastava and Thomson (2009) explain the process of 
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framework analysis as ”the key issues, concepts and themes that have been expressed by 
the participants now form the basis of a thematic framework that can be used to filter and 
classify the data” (p. 76). The key difference between the approach described by them 
and the approach used in this study is that the thematic framework was not formed by the 
results from interviews, but rather, it was informed by the quantitative data analysis and 
literature review. The qualitative results were categorized based on the existing 
framework that was created prior to the interviews.  
 As this research followed an explanatory sequential mixed-methods approach, the 
primary source of data was the quantitative results. The goal of the qualitative results was 
to help clarify and nuance the quantitative data results. For this reason, the qualitative 
results are embedded in the discussion section of the thesis and act as a lens to help 
interpret or clarify the quantitative data results through the discussion. A separate results 
section was not included for the qualitative results in order to avoid redundancies. 
	  
3.5 Limitations  
The primary limitations of this research are a result of the qualitative portion of the 
research collection and analysis. The sample-size, representativeness and bias of the 
participants are possible limitations of the study. As the catastrophe bond market is a 
fairly small and exclusive industry, only three participants were interviewed. While this 
small sample size is relative to the size of the market, the propensity for bias of 
participants to affect the results was substantial. As all three participants are directly 
involved in the catastrophe bond market, there may have been a bias toward a positive 
representation of the industry. In addition, the sample was unbalanced in terms of gender, 
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as all three participants were male. However, depending on the actual gender 
representation in the cat bond market, this may or may not have been an accurate sample 
size in terms of gender based on the industry. Another limitation to the study is the 
possible subjectivity involved in the qualitative descriptive analysis. In analyzing 
qualitative data, there is always a risk of the researcher’s bias impacting the analysis or 
presentation of the results. However, by using a mixed-methods approach, the risk of 
researcher bias in findings is significantly decreased (Ivankova et al., 2006; Krohwinkel, 
2015; Patton, 2015). In addition, by using a qualitative descriptive approach, the 
qualitative data results are meddled with significantly less and are presented as they were 











4. Quantitative Results  
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the results from the quantitative analysis of each cat bond factor. 
The focus of this data analysis was to evaluate each factor separately from another in 
order to determine key actors and processes in the cat bond market. Each factor was 
analyzed separately, arranging various determinants in each category by the dollar value 
and bond issuance falling under that specific determinant. Pivot tables were used to sort 
and merge the data based on dollar and bond issuance. Therefore, the most commonly 
used determinants in each factor group are exposed through this analysis. This chapter 
details the key actors and processes used in each factor of developing a cat bond. All 
results are presented through tables and charts along with further descriptions. Recent 
observed trends in the market are also discussed and explored in this chapter.  
 The remainder of this chapter will detail the findings from the pivot tables 
conducted on each factor. The findings are presented by factor through dollar and bond 
issuance. The chapter will conclude with a summary of the significant results.  
4.2 Quantitative Results by Factor  
 4.2.1 Sponsor 
After separating the sponsor/cedent, dollar value, and bond issuance data from the other 
factors, there were more than 100 companies listed as sponsors. The same sponsors were 
merged together to provide total dollar issuance and bond issuance information for each 
company. As there were over 100 companies, the top five sponsors based on dollar 
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issuances and bond issuances were chosen as most informative for cat bond sponsor 
information.  
 The top five sponsors based on dollar issuance were Swiss Re, USAA, State 
Farm, Citizens Property and Everest Re. Swiss Re was the top sponsor in the cat bond 
market with 12 percent of the total dollar issuance of cat bonds and a cumulative total of 
approximately 10.4 billion USD of the cat bond market. USAA was the second top 
issuer, with 8 percent of total dollar issuance and 7.3 billion USD of cumulative issuance. 
Table 3 below details the top five cat bond sponsors by dollar issuance.  
Table 3: Top 5 Sponsors by Dollar Issuance 
Sponsor/Cedent Dollar Issuance  
(Billions USD) 
% of Total Dollar Issuance 
Swiss Re 10.44 12%  
USAA 7.27 8% 
State Farm 3.29 4% 
Citizens Property 3.10  4% 
Everest Re 2.83 3% 
 
 In order to show the increasing concentration of sponsors in the cat bond market, 
the average dollar issuance, number of bonds and sponsors were calculated between two 
periods of time. Table 4 illustrates how the number of sponsors has significantly 
decreased while the dollar issuance and the number of bonds issued has increased. 
Between the years 2000 to 2005 there were more sponsors despite a smaller average 
dollar issuance. In contrast, between the years 2010 to 2015 there was less than half the 
number of sponsors despite a significant average dollar issuance increase.  









Average # of  
Bonds 
2000-2005 43 $2007.25 72 




Some sponsor information was listed under “unknown”. 10 bonds and 1.7 billion USD of 
dollar issuance came from unknown sponsors. The majority of the remaining sponsors 
were insurance or reinsurance companies that issued less than 8 bonds or 2 billion USD.  
 4.2.2 Location 
Location data was sorted by continent and analyzed by total dollar and bond issuance. 
Where some bonds provided coverage that spanned more than one continent, these values 
were represented more than once for each respective continent they provided coverage 
for. The dollar value was represented fully in each category, therefore, in the location 
section of analysis, the final figures add up to more than the actual cumulative issuance of 
the bonds. However, the percentage of total dollar issuance listed for each continent still 
accurately reflects the portion of the cat bond market each particular continent holds in 
terms of risk coverage. The figure and chart below represent the percentages of risk 
coverage particular continents have rather than the percentage of dollar value.  
 When analyzed from either total dollar issuance or total bond issuance, North 
America held coverage from over 50 percent of the cat bond market. 64.2 billion USD of 
the cat bond market provides risk coverage to North America. When analyzed by dollar 
issuance, 59 percent of the total cat bond market provides risk coverage to countries 
within North America. Similarly, when analyzed for bond issuance, 57 percent of all 
bonds issued cover risks in North America. Of the 472 bonds that were analyzed, 335 of 
them provided coverage to countries within North America. Figure 5 below offers a 
visual representation of the overwhelming percentage of the market that provides 




Figure 5: Location of Coverage by Dollar Issuance 	  
	  
	  
Table 5 below details the dollar issuance and bond issuance of cat bonds based on the 
continent they provide coverage for. While 24 percent of the total cat bond market 
provides risk coverage to Europe and Asia, Africa represents 0 percent of the market with 
0 bonds being issued providing coverage in that region.  
Table 5: Cat Bond Issuance by Continent  
Location Dollar Issuance 
(Millions USD) 
% of Total Dollar 
Issuance 
# of Bonds Issued % of Total Bond 
Issuance  
North America 64,174.98 59% 335 57% 
Europe 15,657.50 14% 97 16% 
Asia 11,047.97 10% 71 12% 
South America 4,856.75 4% 17 3% 
Australia 2,385 2% 13 2% 
Africa 0 0% 0 0% 
Worldwide 193.80 <1% 2 <1% 
Unknown 10,377.33 10% 58 10% 
	  
 It is worthwhile to note that the only countries in Asia represented in the cat bond 
market are Japan, China and Taiwan. As bonds and values were represented more than 
once for each respective area they provided coverage for, “worldwide” refers to those 
bonds that did not specify countries, but were labeled specifically as providing worldwide 
coverage. The location of 58 bonds and 10.4 billion USD were not disclosed and were 























 4.2.3 Risks Covered  
Risks covered data was separated and analyzed independently from location data. Risks 
were grouped into either: multi-peril, earthquake, hurricane, windstorm, named storms, 
extreme mortality, typhoon, healthcare, life embedded value, operational risk, property 
catastrophe risk, mortgage insurance risks, motor, thunderstorm, lottery winning risk, 
temperature risks and unknown. Bonds were divided into one of the risk categories based 
on dollar issuance and bond issuance. Any data that referred to coverage of more than 
one risk was placed in the multi-peril category.  
 Table 6 below details the risks covered based on cumulative dollar issuance and 
bond issuance. Multi-peril was the highest risk coverage category with over 40.6 billion 
USD or 46 percent of cumulative cat bond issuance providing coverage for multi-peril 
risks. Earthquakes and hurricanes were the next most common risk coverage types 
representing 18 and 13 percent of total dollar issuance. Windstorms, named storms and 
extreme mortality were also notable risk coverage categories, representing between 5 to 3 
percent of total dollar issuance.  
 The only notable difference when analyzing for total dollar issuance and total 
bond issuance was the high number of bonds issued for property catastrophe risk despite 
the lower dollar issuance. 26 bonds had been issued to cover property catastrophe risks, 
representing 6 percent of total bond issuance. However, when analyzed for dollar 
issuance, property catastrophe risks only represented 1 percent of the cat bond market, 
with 955 million USD in total cumulative issuance. Although all cat bonds technically 
refer to property risk coverage, this category represents those bonds that specifically 




Table 6: Cat Bond Issuance by Risks Covered 
Risks Covered Dollar Issuance 
(Millions USD) 
% of Total Dollar 
Issuance 
# of Bonds Issued % of Total Bond 
Issuance 
Multi-peril 40,578.10 46% 200 42% 
Earthquake 15,868.39 18% 75 16% 
Hurricane 11,736.86 13% 60 13% 
Windstorm 4,083.90 5% 25 5% 
Named Storms 3,900.24 4% 29 6% 
Extreme Mortality 2,915.50 3% 10 2% 
Typhoon 1,690 1% 9 2% 
Healthcare 1,400 1% 8 2% 
Life Embedded 
Value 
1,087.80 1% 8 2% 
Operational Risk 1,030 1% 4 1% 
Property 
Catastrophe Risk 
955.97 1% 26 6% 
Mortgage 
Insurance Risks 
808.81 1% 3 1% 
Motor 692.10 1% 2 <1% 
Thunderstorm 400 <1% 3 1% 
Lottery Winning 
Risk 
256.70 <1% 2 <1% 
Temperature Risks 132.55 <1% 2 <1% 
Unknown 80.75 <1% 6 1% 
  
 4.2.4 Risk Modellers 
Total dollar issuance and bond issuance was analyzed based on risk modeller by dividing 
cat bond data based on which company provided risk analysis services. In total, there 
were six companies that were identified as risk modellers in the cat bond market: AIR 
Worldwide, RMS, EQECAT, Milliman Inc., Oliver Wyman and Aon Benfield Analytics. 
In addition to these six companies, three additional categories were added: multiple, for 
bonds that used more than one risk modeller, unknown, for bonds which did not disclose 
risk modellers, and investors, a category for bonds where investors undertook their own 
risk modelling.  
 Figure 6 below offers a visual representation of how each risk-modelling 
company is represented in the cat bond market. AIR Worldwide provided risk-modelling 
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services for 44 percent of the market when analyzed by total dollar issuance. 38.9 billion 
USD of the cumulative issuance of cat bonds was modelled for risk by AIR Worldwide. 
In total, 163 bonds identified AIR Worldwide as providing risk-modelling services, 
compared to 81 bonds from the second highest risk modelling company, RMS. When 
comparing RMS and AIR Worldwide through total dollar issuance, the difference is even 
more substantial. While AIR Worldwide provided risk-modelling services for 38.9 billion 
USD of cat bond issuance, RMS provided these services for 16.5 billion USD. Therefore, 
while AIR Worldwide represents 44 percent of risk modelling services based on dollar 
issuance, RMS represents only 19 percent.  
Figure 6: Risk Modellers by Total Dollar Issuance 
 
	  
Table 7 below provides specific dollar issuance and bond issuance data for each risk 
modeller category. A significant portion of cat bond data did not disclose the risk 
modeller used, resulting in 20.5 billion USD of cumulative issuance and 164 bonds being 



























Table 7: Cat Bond Issuance by Risk Modeller  
Risk Modeller Dollar Issuance 
(Millions USD) 
% of Total Dollar 
Issuance 
# of Bonds Issued % of Total Bond 
Issuance 
AIR Worldwide 38,884.40 44% 163 35% 
RMS 16,468.65 19% 81 17% 
EQECAT 8,303.15 10% 37 8% 
Milliman Inc. 2,133.05 2% 13 3% 
Investors undertook 
their own risk 
modelling 
603.67 1% 10 2% 
Oliver Wyman 263.80 <1% 2 <1% 
Multiple 300 <1% 1 <1% 
Aon Benfield 
Analytics 
44 <1% 1 <1% 
Unknown 20,516.96 24% 164 35% 
  
 4.2.5 Trigger Types 
Total cat bond dollar issuance and bond issuance were analyzed based on the assigned 
trigger type for the bond. Seven trigger types were identified: indemnity, industry loss, 
parametric, multiple, modelled loss, mortality index and medical benefit ratio (definitions 
can be found in Table 1). An unknown category was also created in order to represent 
those bonds that did not specify a trigger type. Table 8 below details the trigger types 
based on cumulative dollar issuance and bond issuance.  
Table 8: Cat Bond Issuance by Trigger Type 
Trigger Type Dollar Issuance 
(Millions USD) 
% of Total Dollar 
Issuance 
# of Bonds Issued % of Total Bond 
Issuance 
Indemnity 40,757.49 47% 185 39% 
Industry Loss 22,007.30 25% 112 24% 
Parametric 9,670.35 11% 74 16% 
Multiple 4,527.60 5% 26 5% 
Modelled Loss 3,343.90 4% 23 5% 
Mortality Index 2,965.50 3% 11 2% 
Medical Benefit 
Ratio 
1,400 2% 8 2% 





A relatively small portion of the data did not disclose a trigger type, resulting in 2.8 
billion USD and 33 bonds being placed in the unknown category. The indemnity trigger 
represented a vast majority of cat bonds, with 185 bonds and 39 percent of the total bond 
issuance falling under this trigger type. When analyzed based on dollar issuance, the 
indemnity trigger represented 47 percent of the market, with 40.8 billion USD in total 
issuance. Figure 7 below offers a visual representation of the percentage of the cat bond 
market with an indemnity trigger type. Industry loss was the second most common trigger 
type in the cat bond market. 22 billion USD or 25 percent of total dollar issuance had an 
industry loss trigger type. 185 bonds in total used the industry loss trigger, representing 
24 percent of total bond issuance.  
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 4.2.6 Ratings 
While 45 percent of all bond data did not provide any rating information, investment 
ratings have decidedly been included in the results section for personal interest but should 
be given somewhat limited weight. 40.7 billion USD of cumulative dollar issuance and 
212 bonds did not provide rating information. However, of those bonds that were rated, 
161 bonds were given a substantial credit risk rating, representing 34 percent of all dollar 
issuance. 27.2 billion USD of total dollar issuance fell under the substantial credit risk 
rating.  Table 9 below gives details of ratings based on dollar issuance and bond issuance. 
High credit risk was the second most common rating, with 79 bonds and 16.4 billion 
USD falling under this rating. Moderate credit risk was the third most common rating, 
with 1.5 billion USD in cumulative issuance being given this rating. 
  
Table 9: Cat Bond Issuance By Investment Rating 
Rating Dollar Issuance 
(Millions USD) 
% of Total Dollar 
Issuance 
# of Bonds Issued % of Total Bond 
Issuance 
Unknown 40,669.76 46% 212 45% 
Substantial Credit 
Risk 
27,177 31% 161 34% 
High Credit Risk 16,427.06 19% 79 17% 
Moderate Credit 
Risk 
1,500 2% 10 2% 
Low Credit Risk 909.90 1% 6 1% 
Near Default 486.95 1% 2 1% 
Multiple Ratings 200 <1% 1 <1% 
Very High Credit 
Risk 







 4.2.7 Placement/Structuring Agents 
After separating the placement/structuring agent data, dollar value and bond issuance data 
from the other factors, there were over 30 companies listed as placement/structuring 
agents. The same companies were merged together to provide total dollar issuance and 
bond issuance information for each company. As there were over 30 companies, the top 
five placement/structuring agents based on dollar issuance and bond issuances were 
chosen as most informative for cat bond bank or broker information.  
 The top five placement/structuring agents based on cumulative dollar issuance 
were Goldman Sachs, Aon Benfield Securities, Swiss Re, GC Securities and Willis 
Capital Markets. Goldman Sachs was the top placement/structuring agent in the cat bond 
market with 24 percent of the total dollar issuance of cat bonds and a cumulative total of 
approximately 18.5 billion USD of the cat bond market. Aon Benfield Securities was the 
second top broker, with 20 percent of total dollar issuance and 14.96 billion USD of 
cumulative issuance. Table 10 below details the top five cat bond placement/structuring 
agents by dollar issuance. 
Table 10: Top 5 Placement/Structuring Agents by Dollar Issuance 
Placement/Structuring  
Agent 
Dollar Issuance  
(Millions USD) 
% of Total Dollar Issuance 
Goldman Sachs 18,545 24%  
Aon Benfield Securities 14,957 20% 
Swiss Re 12,972.15 17% 
GC Securities 5,657.50 7% 
Willis Capital Markets 3,814.90 5% 
 
When analyzing agents by bond issuance, all of the same companies remained in the top 
five as when analyzed by dollar issuance, but in a different order. Swiss Re was the top 
broker for cat bonds with a total of 90 bonds issued, totalling 19 percent of cumulative 
bond issuance. Goldman Sachs was the second top issuer when analyzed for bond 
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issuance, with 70 total bonds issued and 15 percent of cumulative bond issuance. Table 
11 below details the top five cat bond placement/structuring agents based on bond 
issuance. Some placement/structuring agent information was listed under “unknown”. 92 
bonds and 698.9 million of dollar issuance did not disclose placement/structuring agents.  
Table 11: Top 5 Placement/Structuring Agents by Bond Issuance	  
Placement/Structuring Agent # of Bonds Issued % of Total Bond Issuance 
Swiss Re 90 19%  
Goldman Sachs 70  15%  
Aon Benfield Securities 61  13% 
GC Securities 36  7% 
Willis Capital Markets 22 4% 
 
4.3 Observed Trends  
In order to analyze and observe recent trends and changes in the cat bond market, the date 
of issuance was added to the data analysis as a new pivot table factor. By including the 
year of issuance in the data, each factor could be charted based on yearly issuance and the 
growth of specific factors within the cat bond market could be analyzed. Based on these 
observations, particular factors have been included in this results section based on yearly 
growth.  
 This section will provide an analysis of the yearly growth of particular issuance 
factors within the cat bond market. The findings are presented through dollar issuance in 
millions USD. All results are presented through charts created by the pivot table data 
results.  
 4.3.1 Catastrophe Bond Market Growth 
Figure 8 below charts the cumulative growth and total market size of the cat bond market 
since its inception in December 1996. The cumulative dollar issuance of the cat bond 
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market was charted semi-annually each year in June and December. The chart below 
shows that the market has seen continued steady growth since its inception. The 
cumulative dollar issuance on June 1st, 2017 was 88.02 billion USD. Since the inception 
of cat bonds and the first entry on Artemis’ transaction database on December 1996, there 
has not been a period semi-annually that has not seen increased dollar issuance. From 
December 2016 to June 2017, there has been an increase of 8.3 billion USD in the total 
market size. 
 
Figure 8: Cumulative Market Size (Semi-Annual)  
	  
 4.3.2 Yearly Risk Type Growth 
Figure 9 below charts the cumulative dollar issuance of cat bonds based on risk coverage. 
The chart shows how coverage of particular types of risks has been reflected in the cat 
bond market. As discussed in section 4.2.3, multi-peril risk coverage is the most widely 
used. Since 1998, multi-peril coverage has been the most popular form of risk coverage 
for cat bonds. In 2014, multi-peril risk coverage reached its highest issuance with peak 
cumulative issuance at 2.95 billion USD. 
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 Other particular risks have varied in their market representations, seeing different 
periods of peak dollar issuance. In 1998, hurricanes were the most popular form of risk 
coverage with 715.1 million USD of cumulative issuance providing hurricane coverage. 
In 2007, hurricanes were the second most common type of risk following multi-peril, 
with peak cumulative issuance at 1.74 billion USD. In 2014, earthquake risks were the 
second most common type of risk coverage following multi-peril, with peak cumulative 
issuance at 2.45 billion USD. Named storms risk coverage reached its peak in 2015, with 
peak cumulative issuance at 1.64 billion USD.  
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 4.3.3 Yearly Trigger Type Growth 
Figure 10 below charts the cumulative dollar issuance of cat bonds based on trigger 
types. The chart illustrates how particular trigger types have been represented in the cat 
bond market since inception. As discussed in section 4.2.5, the indemnity trigger is 
currently the most popular trigger type in the market. The indemnity trigger reached its 
highest issuance in 2014 with peak cumulative issuance at 6.54 billion USD. The 
indemnity trigger has steadily been the most popular trigger type since 2010. It was also 
the most popular trigger type from 1996 to 1999.  
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 At different periods both industry loss and parametric trigger types have seen 
peak issuance and even outperformed the indemnity trigger in the market. In 1999, 
industry loss was the most popular trigger type with 1.3 billion USD in cumulative 
issuance. It also spiked in 2006, and was the most popular trigger type with 2.45 billion 
USD in cumulative issuance. In 2014, the industry loss trigger reached its peak issuance 
at 2.98 billion USD, but was still outperformed by indemnity at 6.54 billion USD. The 
parametric trigger type outperformed the indemnity trigger from 2001 to 2008, reaching 
peak cumulative issuance at 3.51 billion USD in 2007.   
 Aside from indemnity, industry loss and parametric trigger types, there are no 
significant trigger type growths in peak issuance. Based on the analysis of the cumulative 
dollar issuance from 1996 to present, the indemnity, industry loss and parametric trigger 
types are the most widely represented across the market.  
 4.3.4 Yearly Location Growth 
Figure 11 below charts the cumulative dollar issuance of cat bonds based on the location 
of risk coverage. As discussed in section 4.2.2, North America represents the vast 
majority of cat bond coverage. Figure 11 illustrates how the cat bond market in North 
America has dominated the market since 1997. While cat bond risk coverage in North 
America has seen growth and stagnation, it has remained the top continental area for risk 
coverage since the inception of the market.  
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Figure 11: Yearly Location Growth by Dollar Issuance 
Europe has primarily been the second most represented area for risk coverage, followed 
by Asia. Europe reached its peak cumulative dollar issuance in 2007 with 1.47 billion 
USD. However, in 2007, this still did not come close to North American coverage, which 
reached 4.29 billion USD. Asia reached its peak cumulative issuance in 2006 at 1.31 
billion USD. However, once again this did not reach North American coverage, which 
was at 3.59 billion USD in 2006. 
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4.4 Summary of Results 
This chapter has presented the results of pivot tables conducted on data from the Artemis 
deal directory based on specific issuance and development factors. Overall, significant 
details have been found through this analysis. The priority of this analysis was to identify 
key actors and processes in the cat bond market. This quantitative analysis has exposed 
the most commonly used determinants in developing and issuing cat bonds by arranging 
various determinants by dollar value and bond issuance. It has also identified emerging 
trends in the cat bond market by analyzing yearly data.  
 Through this analysis, key actors in the development and distribution of cat bonds 
have been identified. This includes the top five sponsors/issuers of cat bonds, the risk 
modelling companies used to identify risk and value the bonds, and the top five 
placement/structuring agents involved in facilitating cat bond transactions. These key 
actors have been identified through each of their respective bond issuances and 
cumulative dollar issuances. Other key factors in the cat bond market were also disclosed 
through this analysis. The areas that are provided risk coverage by cat bonds were 
identified and disclosed based on continent. The types of risks most commonly covered 
through cat bond issuance were also disclosed through this analysis. The various trigger 
types used to generate a cat bond payout and the representative usage of each type was 
also explained through the data analysis. Finally, cat bond investment ratings were also 
discussed and explored through the pivot table analysis.  
 In the next chapter, these results will be discussed in more detail by identifying 
initial interpretations of the quantitative results as well as using qualitative results for 




5.1 Analysis through Framework  
To begin a discussion of the quantitative and qualitative results, the framework of 
analysis will be reintroduced. As mentioned in section 2.2.4, the conceptual framework 
that is being used for this thesis is based on the three mechanisms of financialization 
developed by Castree (2003) and demonstrated by Knox-Hayes (2013). This framework 
identifies the three main steps taken in the process of financialization. These three 
mechanisms are: privatization through ownership, individuation through 
commensuration, and displacement through mobilization. By exemplifying how each step 
of this process is used in the development and distribution of catastrophe bonds, they will 
be exposed as a form of financialization.  
 The discussion and analysis section below breaks up the process of developing 
and distributing cat bonds based on which mechanism each factor falls under. The 
quantitative and qualitative results will be presented and discussed based on their role 
within the three mechanisms of financialization. Each factor of analysis that was 
researched will be placed under one of the three mechanisms of financialization and 
discussed in this context. Each of the three mechanisms of financialization represents a 
specific step toward the financialization of a particular resource. By analyzing cat bonds 
through each of these mechanisms, the actors and procedures involved in creating and 
selling cat bonds will be broken down while exposing them as a form of financialization 




5.2 Privatization through Ownership  
 Catastrophe bonds exemplify this mechanism of financialization as they are first 
defined by ownership. As catastrophe bonds represent risk coverage, the ownership 
aspect refers to the owners of the natural catastrophe risk, which in this case are the 
sponsors. The sponsors privatize the risks that are defined for coverage through a claim 
of ownership. This section of the discussion will analyze the sponsors, location of risk 
coverage, and the risks that are defined for coverage as they fall under the mechanism of 
privatization through ownership.  
 5.2.1 Sponsor 
The first stage of developing a cat bond involves a company or institution identifying 
natural catastrophe risks they are exposed to and want coverage for. The first actor 
involved in the development of a cat bond is the sponsor. When asked about the process 
of developing a cat bond, participant 101 replied, “It really begins back when an insurer, 
reinsurer, or even corporation begins to look at its risk transfer.” The process of 
developing a cat bond begins with the sponsor reviewing their risk transfer solutions and 
recognizing risks that need further coverage. The sponsor has to claim ownership over a 
particular natural catastrophe risk in order to begin the process of developing a cat bond.  
 The Artemis data results revealed the top sponsors of cat bonds. The top seven 
sponsors when analyzed by total dollar issuance and total bond issuance were Swiss Re, 
USAA, Munich Re, State Farm, Citizens Property, SCOR and Everest Re. Table 4 
demonstrated the decreasing number of sponsors despite the increasing market size. This 
findings serves to illustrate the concentration of actors in the cat bond market. Participant 
101 identified the majority of cat bond sponsors as insurers and reinsurers,  
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 “When the market began, there was a lot of reinsurance companies because they 
 were really the biggest and they were the ones who had the resources to test out 
 the market. And they understood it and they could do a lot with it themselves and 
 make it easier. But now, really, primary insurers are the main issuers. They 
 probably make up somewhere around 40 percent of the total issuance, actually 
 maybe even 50. And then reinsurers would be 30 and then the other 20 is a 
 mixture of corporate government agencies and things like that.” 
 
Participant 103 echoed a similar opinion, noting, “It used to be only large insurers which 
used this product, now smaller insurers are using it.” Participants made it clear that the 
majority of the cat bond market is still sponsored by insurers and reinsurers. Therefore, it 
is insurers and reinsurers that are the prevalent actors in the first mechanism of 
financialization by privatizing these risks through a claim of ownership.  
 5.2.2 Location 
Another important aspect in evaluating the privatization through ownership mechanism 
inherent in the development of cat bonds is the actual risks and locations that are being 
privatized through this process. The natural catastrophe risks that are being privatized are 
tied to a real spatial and temporal landscape. In the quantitative results section of this 
paper, the risk coverage was analyzed by location and risk. The location of specific risks 
helps to emphasize which areas of the world are receiving capital risk coverage through 
privatization and which other areas of the world have not received ownership claims over 
their catastrophe risks.  
 In the quantitative results section, Table 5 identified cat bond risk coverage by 
continent. Between 57 and 59 percent of all cat bond issuance provided coverage for 
natural catastrophe risks in North America. Europe represented between 14 and 16 
percent of coverage and Asia represented 10 to 12 percent of coverage. No bonds had 
been issued for risk coverage in Africa and between 3 and 4 percent provided coverage to 
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South America. Mexico received the majority of coverage from bonds issued for risk 
coverage in South America. Although Asia represented a somewhat significant portion of 
risk coverage, the only countries that were represented in the market were China, Japan 
and Taiwan. Based on these observations, it is clear that the cat bond market is 
centralized in the developed, wealthy world and provides little to no coverage to the less 
affluent, developing world. While the bonds first developed in North America, based on 
the results, the coverage seems to be spreading to other affluent, developed countries and 
has not yet been significantly used in an effort to help developing countries deal with 
natural catastrophe risks.  
 Findings from the literature review revealed that some academics argued for the 
use of cat bonds based on their ability to help the developing world manage risk by 
accessing global funds to cover disasters. However, based on the quantitative findings, 
this has not been the case in the history of the cat bond market. Coverage is 
overwhelmingly centered in North America and the developing world. Based on these 
quantitative findings, participants were asked if they thought that cat bonds might result 
in insurance for the rich only, or if they believed that eventually the market could offer 
solutions to the developing world.  
 When asked why the majority of cat bond coverage was in North America, 
participant 102 explained the reason for the lack of coverage in the developing world,  
 “The reason why the rich are more dominant in the catastrophe bond market is 
 simply because that’s where the property concentration is, that’s where the value 
 is. Values are high on properties. Therefore, if there are reinsurance companies 
 that are providing reinsurance protection, it becomes a concentration problem for 
 them, and they charge more and more. Therefore, there is a need for reducing 




Participant 102 continued by explaining that there is currently less of a need for cat bonds 
in the developing world,  
 “Emerging markets are actually a diversifier for reinsures, so they’re able to 
 provide that reinsurance protection very cost effectively, and there’s less of a 
 need for capital markets to step in. It’s not that the capital market doesn’t want to 
 step in; it’s just that there is less of a need and less of a reason to step in. It could, 
 obviously as emerging markets become richer and richer, then additional need for 
 buying protection and property values goes up, there is definitely a bigger role 
 that capital markets can play.” 
 
Based on participant 102’s response, the developing world does not have a need for 
capital market solutions to risk transfer because they do not have any issues with risk 
transfer. One of the central reasons the cat bond market was created was based on the 
limited capacity of the reinsurance industry and an overabundance of insurance risks. 
However, if the developing world does not have this overabundance of risk and the 
reinsurance market in those countries has the capacity to handle insurance risks, is there a 
need for cat bonds in these markets? This line of thinking would contest climate change 
science, which has indicated that the developing world will suffer the majority of natural 
disasters and costs as a result of their geographical locations.  
 Participant 101 was asked the same question, and identified a slightly different 
reason for the lack of cat bonds in the developing world, 
 “If you look at the insurance markets in those parts of the world, even in India, 
 where there's a very large insurance market, the insurance policies are very 
 small- the overall size and amount of premiums is still quite small, it's growing 
 fast, but it's not yet very big. They don't buy a great deal of reinsurance there. 
 They also buy most of their reinsurance from within their own borders, from their 
 companies within their own country, because their government mandates they 
 shouldn't be sending too much money offshore. So these things hold back the 




If the governments in developing nations want to keep capital within their own borders, 
they may be opposed to cat bonds, which would transfer capital to the global market. 
Participant 101 continued,  
 “That said- if you could make issuance cheaper, which in my opinion can be done 
 because the World Bank can issue a cat bond through its own treasury which 
 should be a much cheaper way to do it as possible, then there's absolutely no 
 reason why you couldn't see national cat bonds for Cambodia, for all these other 
 places, but someone has to pay the premium. And if the governments aren't going 
 to pay the premiums, the insurance companies are too small, the premium levels 
 aren't big enough, they're not using enough reinsurance, then it will just take time 
 until those countries develop further I guess.” 
 
Participant 103 echoed a similar point,  
 “We talked about some of these World Bank initiatives and sometimes you have 
 solutions in search of a problem. And I think that's what you kind of find in the 
 Third World. There are a lot of people who are talking about providing these 
 services or providing this catastrophe coverage, but there's not a lot of money 
 able to pay for it because they are, unfortunately, addressing other economic 
 concerns.” 
 
All of the participants agreed that at the moment the developing world does not have an 
immediate need for cat bonds. The reinsurance market in those nations is not big enough 
to require capital market risk transfer solutions. Participants argued that once developing 
nations become more affluent and continue to grow economically, they might see cat 
bonds enter this market as a risk transfer solution. However, based on the quantitative and 
qualitative findings, the primary risks that are being privatized through ownership are in 
developed and affluent areas, primarily North America. Based on data and interview 
results, proponents of cat bonds utilizing the argument that they can offer developing 
world risk solutions should rethink the viability of this idea. If cat bonds are a solution to 
over-accumulation and capacity issues for the developed world, their use may make for a 
more efficient and stable risk management market. However, touting the opportunities cat 
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bonds pose for risk management in the developing world seems to be a problematic 
argument in need of further clarification.  
 The concentration of cat bonds in the developed world further implicates the 
financialization of these risks. There is a spatial link between cat bonds and where capital 
markets are most developed, which has resulted in the concentration of cat bonds in 
North America and other affluent areas. This raises the question of whether cat bonds 
provide risk coverage in those areas that need it or if they simply further concentrate 
wealth in the most developed capital markets and propel the agenda of financialization in 
accelerating the rates of profit accumulation.  
 5.2.3 Risks Covered  
In evaluating privatization through ownership, a final and important aspect to discuss is 
the specific type of risks that are being privatized and claimed ownership of through this 
mechanism. These risks represent the top priorities for cat bond issuance and identify 
what areas of risk are receiving financial coverage through the bonds. In the quantitative 
results section of this paper, cat bonds were analyzed by which type of risk they provided 
coverage for. Table 6 identified the types of risks that receive coverage through the cat 
bond market.  
 Multi-peril coverage was identified as the leading type of cat bond risk coverage 
with between 42 and 46 percent of the market. Figure 9 illustrated how multi-peril 
coverage has seen continued growth in the market since 1998. The other top risks 
identified in the market were earthquakes, hurricanes and storms. Property catastrophe 
risk did not represent a high portion of dollar issuance in the cat bond market, but when 
evaluated by bond issuance, a significant portion of cat bonds had been issued with this 
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type of risk coverage. Participant 102 identified property catastrophe risk as a leading risk 
in the market, “First and foremost, the underlying fundamental risk in catastrophe bonds 
is the property catastrophe- mostly- property catastrophe risk.” Participant 102 
continued,  
 “The insurance industry operates to provide protection against property values 
 and other things to their clients… for example, hurricanes in Florida, or on the 
 east coast of the US, or earthquakes in California, cause an accumulation of risk 
 and therefore, reinsurance companies want to take up protection.”  
	  
In this sense, most cat bonds do cover property catastrophe risks. All coverage that names 
multi-peril, earthquakes, hurricanes, etc., are essentially a form of property catastrophe 
risk in that property destruction and value loss is what is at risk with the occurrence of 
any of these disasters. If any cat bonds trigger based on most risk types, their payout 
would go toward covering property damages.  
 Participant 101 noted that cat bonds are beginning to be more expansive in their 
coverage,  
 “Cat bonds could be deemed to have slightly more restrictive cover because they 
 are very strictly worded documentation. But, gradually, the terms- the terms 
 aren't easing- but they are including more things in cat bonds, so you now get 
 cat bonds that include a range of weather perils as well as catastrophe perils. 
 So, a big insurer can cover more of the risks that they would have been buying 
 coverage for through the reinsurance market, they can now get through the cat 
 bond market.”  
	  
In discussing risk coverage, participant 102 noted,  
 
 “You know, I think the overarching theme is that as the insurers and people 
 become more aware of the concentration of peak risk that they have and as the 
 property values appreciate, as the events happen, and people realize that they are 
 exposed to it, there is a growing need for buying insurance protection, and 
 disposing that risk. So risk management becomes important, and catastrophe 




Based on these participant responses coupled with the quantitative results, cat bonds are 
primarily used to cover property damages from possible near term natural catastrophes. 
The risk coverage continues to expand and grow, including more risks within a particular 
cat bond as indicated through the dominance of the multi-peril risk coverage in the 
market. However, as climate change threatens to increase the occurrence of natural 
catastrophes, an interesting question is whether cat bond sponsors and issuers view 
climate change risks as a top priority or a threat to their viability.  
 Participants were asked their opinions about the ability of cat bonds to address 
climate change risks in the present or the future. Participant 102 stated, “One aspect of 
risk management is, you know, any climatic changes and how that potentially increases 
the risk and therefore, the need for risk protection. And catastrophe bonds can play a 
part in it”. Participant 103 agreed, noting that the industry understood the risks of climate 
change, but did not view them with immediacy,  
 “Climate change is certainly one factor. One of the nice things about our market 
 is that our buyers, our customers- they’re professional insurers. So they get it. 
 They’re actually feeling those exposures and they do recognize that it’s a 
 problem. But there’s not a lot of immediacy to it. There’s not a lot of immediate 
 urgency, because it is down the road. And until we start seeing loss activity, 
 you’re not going to see an immediate reaction.”  
 
Participant 102 made a similar point, arguing,  
 
 “I think a way to describe it is that global warming and associated climatological 
 issues that you are referring to is a long-term trend line. But along that long-term 
 trend line you have short-term fluctuations. You know, some years are bad- some 
 years are good. There is a lot of noise around it. That noise also has a number of 
 climatological factors associated with it, like what I mentioned about Atlantic 
 multi-decadal oscillation and El Nino, La Nina cycles and many other factors like 




Participant 102 continued, “It is not going to manifest itself over the next 2 to 3 years, but 
it will show up eventually. And catastrophe bonds will definitely play an important role 
on an ongoing basis”.  
 Participants 102 and 103 both made clear that climate change issues are not 
viewed as an issue of immediacy in the cat bond industry. They viewed short-term 
climate trends as a more pressing issue and saw climate change as a long-term trend that 
would not affect the cat bond market in the near future. While they indicated that the 
insurance and reinsurance industry does view climate change as a concern for the 
industry, they are not acting on it as of yet in any significant way.  
 Participant 101 argued that the insurance industry recognizes that climate change 
is a risk and factors it in to risk coverage as much as possible, noting,  
 “Yes, it is factored in- in as much as it can be. The one thing I will say is the 
 insurance and reinsurance industry- that includes cat bonds and ILS and all of 
 the other areas- does a heck of a lot more than the banking industry does in terms 
 of looking at climate risk on the assets that they hold.” 
 
Participant 101 saw adaptation and resilience efforts as a possibility for the cat bond 
market in the future, but argued that different tools could be better suited, 
 “If it’s just that a government wants to enhance its resilience to catastrophe risk, 
 then it can go to the capital markets and buy insurance essentially. So that’s good 
 for them… But I think specifically, on the sort of resilience and adaptation side of 
 things, I think we will see something come out of those efforts, but I think it will be 
 some time and I think it will look very different to a cat bond. And the investors 
 who actually end up backing that will probably be quite different as well, or if 
 they are the same, it will be going into a different portfolio. Because one of the 
 main reasons investors like cat bonds is that they don't have any financial market 
 risk attached to them. Um- so as soon as you throw infrastructure risk or 
 something tied to a government into that bond, um, you've kind of destroyed the 
 low correlation argument that cat bonds have always had.”  
 
Based on the qualitative results, participants seem to view climate change risks as 
substantial, but not immediate. They see these risks as long-term and view cat bonds as 
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addressing short-term concerns. Cat bonds are not widely viewed as a means of 
adaptation to climate change, but rather, as a short-term risk transfer solution. In this 
regard, the cat bond market will not likely view climate change with any immediacy until 
the market starts to see loss activity as a result.  
 Climate change may increase the possibility of the risks covered by cat bonds 
meeting their trigger events. These interviews have demonstrated that climate change can 
and has been financialized by privatizing ownership and definitions of risk. While 
climate change risks are not viewed with immediacy, the risks that are covered by cat 
bonds can be affected by climate change and global warming. As climate change risks 
continue to grow, the privatization of these risks through claims of ownership will 
continue the process of financialization by using market mechanisms to offer financial 
coverage for these risks.  
5.3 Individuation through Commensuration  
 Catastrophe bonds exemplify this mechanism of financialization through their 
transformation of catastrophic risks into credits. The process of transforming catastrophic 
risks into dollar amounts and creating the bonds represents the individuation through 
commensuration stage of financialization. Catastrophic risks are valued based on market 
factors and risk modelling. This section of the discussion will analyze the drivers of cat 
bond pricing as well as the research findings on risk modelling, trigger types and ratings 
as they fall under the mechanism of individuation through commensuration.  
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 5.3.1 Drivers of Catastrophe Bond Pricing 
An important step in the process of the financialization of natural catastrophe risks 
involves evaluating the risks and putting a price on them. There are many factors that 
impact the pricing of cat bonds. The risk modelling process is an important aspect of 
pricing that will be discussed in the section below. However, to discuss some of the 
drivers of cat bond pricing, this section will draw solely on interview results, as it is more 
descriptive and quantitative data analysis does not inform this section.  
 Participants were asked to describe the process of determining the value of a cat 
bond to explain what factors and conditions can drive pricing. Participant 101 explained, 
“For the valuation of the bond- if it’s a 100 million deal- that means it provides 100 
million of cover. So in the same way that a 100 million reinsurance arrangement is 
defined by the amount of limit or coverage that's involved”. Participant 101 continued,  
 “The payment that the investor gets a hold in the risk, is pretty much akin to a 
 reinsurance premium. So the premium payment goes to the investors instead of to 
 the reinsurer. And then there are associated costs which are administrative, and 
 sort of the structuring costs and things like that, I guess. So, from a value point of 
 view, when a transaction is issued, typically a cat bond if it's a 100 million dollar 
 cat bond, it will be split up into individual notes that are worth 250 thousand 
 each. Those get issued at par, so at fixed cost, there are however many notes, all 
 the transactions, and then once that goes into the market the value of those notes 
 can fluctuate based on the time of year because of seasonality, as in what the risk 
 of what a particular peril is, particularly if it's like windstorm or thunderstorm 
 or something like that, changes and fluctuates throughout the year with the 
 seasons. So that affects the secondary value.”  
 
 Participant 101 explained the process of pricing a bond. The explanation given 
was consistent with the findings from the literature review. The price of a cat bond is 
determined by how much coverage the sponsors are looking for based on a particular 
peril and their risk of loss. The price of the cat bond is directly linked to the price of the 
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coverage the cat bond will pay out. Seasonality can affect the pricing based on particular 
risks throughout the term of the cat bond.  
 Participant 102 explained some of the drivers of cat bond pricing and what can 
make the prices increase and decrease. The first point involved the state of the market 
from the insurer perspective,  
 “When there is abundance of capital available, clearly there is a pressure on the 
 pricing. When there is a dearth of capital, which typically happens after some 
 kind of an event, there is less capital available, and then there is demand for 
 higher pricing. And the reason for that is obviously because the cost of capital 
 goes up when there is dearth of capital. So one of the main factors is of course 
 what is happening in the traditional reinsurance market, how much capital is 
 available, supply demand dynamics in the market.” 
 
The amount of investors and capital available for cat bond investment at a particular point 
in time can drive pricing. When there are a lot of investors and an abundance of capital in 
the market, cat bond pricing decreases. However, when there is limited capital and 
investors in the market, cat bond pricing increases. Participant 102 explained a second 
driver of pricing from the investors perspective, 
 “Secondly, from the investors perspective also, how does the catastrophe bond 
 and other capital market investments compare with the other investments, other 
 asset classes…So what is happening with the spreads on that side. There are 
 different historic time periods where the spreads of catastrophe bonds reacted 
 differently. So, for example, after Hurricane Katrina, where there was a depletion 
 of capital, the spreads of catastrophe bonds went up. Simply because it went up, 
 capital became expensive. So spreads on catastrophe bonds went up. Whereas, if 
 you think about what happened after the financial crisis or during the financial 
 crisis in 2008 and early 2009, catastrophe asset classes widened out significantly, 
 the risk premium went up, high yield bond spreads went up, and catastrophe bond 
 spreads also went up.” 
 
Participant 102 is explaining how the pricing of bonds can go up based on the 
performance of other investments classes. As cat bonds have a low correlation to the rest 
of the capital market, their popularity could increase when other asset classes are 
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performing poorly, thus affecting pricing. However, as cat bonds are correlated with 
natural catastrophe risk, as weather risks increase, their popularity could decrease, also 
affecting pricing.  
 The results from the qualitative interviews describing the drivers of cat bond 
pricing were consistent with findings from the literature review. The pricing of cat bonds 
represents the individuation through commensuration mechanism of financialization 
through its conversion of natural catastrophe risks into exchangeable assets.  
 5.3.2 Risk Modellers 
In discussing the process of identifying and pricing natural catastrophe risk, catastrophe 
risk modelling is a very important element. The risk modelling companies that perform 
an analysis of natural catastrophe risks for sponsors and investors have a significant 
amount of control over which risks are identified and their importance. Participant 102 
explained,  
 “There are third party independent firms who have spent a lot of effort into 
 developing statistical models to model those things. And those are probabilistic 
 models, so they give you the probability of events happening. And they also look 
 at the exposure data and calculate the potential losses that could happen. And 
 there are a couple of well-known, well-established players in that market who 
 perform this analysis.” 
 
The quantitative data results identified the top players in the risk modelling market who 
conduct the majority of cat bond risk analysis. Table 7 identified the risk modelling 
companies by the amount of bonds issued which used their services as well as the total 
dollar amount issued using their services. AIR Worldwide was identified as the top risk 
modelling company, with 44 percent of total cat bond dollar issuance utilizing their risk 
modelling services. RMS was the second most popular service with 19 percent of total 
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cat bond dollar issuance utilizing their risk modelling services. The other risk modelling 
companies were all below 10 percent of total dollar issuance in the market. Discovering 
that two companies conducted the majority of risk modelling services was very surprising 
and warranted further inquiry.  
 Participants were asked if they had any concerns with the fact that the same two 
companies performed most of the risk analysis for cat bonds. They were also asked if 
they were aware of any challenges or data gaps in the risk modelling industry. Participant 
102 answered,  
 “One of the good things about property catastrophe is that we have plenty of 
 historical data for some key perils… For many peril zones, the analysis is, you 
 know, robust. There is wide availability of these tools, and of course you have to 
 pay for it and all that. But they are available, and one can use them. But then 
 there are other perils where the credible models either don’t exist, or if the model 
 exists, there are gaps in it. So for those things, underwriters actually use actuarial 
 techniques to do the analysis. And it’s not all that different from what reinsurance 
 companies have been doing for years. So, underwriters who are in reinsurance 
 companies are able to do that analysis very effectively.” 
 
Participant 102 argued that current risk analysis techniques were robust and did not show 
concern about the dominance of the market by two companies. Participant 101 expressed 
a bit more concern over this market dominance, but argued that most investors utilize 
more than one service, 
 “I see reasons why a complete reliance on three companies view of risk is not 
 always the best thing in the world. Especially when you look at the differences 
 between the model outputs. So, you could see one model telling you that the same 
 risk is nearly twice as risky as another model tells you. That makes it very, very 
 difficult for insurers and reinsurers. But, I don't know anybody who relies only on 
 those models, I really don't. I don't know any investors who only rely on those 
 models, pretty much everybody is taking a model, looking at it as an indicative 
 baseline and then they're laying on top of it their own assumptions and their 
 own view of risk. Some people create their own models as well. Most of the 
 funds that invest in cat bonds will run at least two of those models, plus their own 
 models, and they look  at everything multiple ways with their own fine tuning on 




Participant 101 seemed confident that investors did not rely on only one company’s view 
of risk. Although they may identify one company as the primary risk modeller, 
participant 101 argued that they also utilized the services of many other modellers, some 
even creating their own models of risk. Participant 101 continued,  
 “The problem is there is no- I mean these are uncertain events. For example, an 
 earthquake, while you might think it's a one in a hundred year event, you could 
 have six of them in a row in two days, nobody knows. And nobody can really 
 predict that. So they can only look at the available data I guess, and come up with 
 a view of risk that they're comfortable with, based on sort of using their own 
 expertise as well. But yeah, I mean, it's a problem that there is no clear standard 
 for viewing these risks. But at the same time it's not possible because when are 
 you ever going to have consensus on that sort of thing.”  
 
Participant 101 identified that it was problematic to not have a clear standard for risk 
modelling, however, argued that this would be impossible. Views of future risk will 
always be varied and it is impossible to have everyone agree on one prediction. 
Participant 101 was fairly consistent with participant 102, both confident that the risk 
modelling was robust.  
 An area of interest was whether risk modellers factored climate change into their 
risk analysis. Participants were asked their opinions on if- and how- risk-modelling 
techniques factored climate change risks into their analysis. Participant 103 noted two 
different approaches to risk modelling: long-term and short-term. The participant noted 
that short-term modelling is more relevant to day-to-day underwriting and pricing, 
saying, “It's long-term planning over day trading. Neither is wrong.” Participant 102 also 





 “There are some other climatic factors that come into play when we do the 
 evaluation of catastrophe bonds and those are things like El Nino, La Nina, 
 Atlantic multi-decadal oscillation and things of that nature, that on the shorter 
 term, have a bigger impact on the potential for losses than the long-term climate 
 factors that you are referring to. If you think about it, the catastrophe bonds that 
 we are evaluating, we are buying, issuing etc., are typically, you know 2 years, 3 
 years, 4 years. The climatic factors that you are referring to are actually long-
 term phenomenon. So yes, eventually they will have an impact, but over the next 
 2-3 years, the analysis is pretty solid based on the historical data and on the 
 stochastic model that we have available.”  
 
Participant 103 echoed a similar sentiment, noting, 
 “You can't draw a direct correlation to any individual event to climate change. 
 But if the trends are real, you better be planning for it. Really, all insurance 
 companies do that; they're all recognizing it. But there are other trends in 
 aggregation of values in these exposed zones. So to the point you made at the 
 beginning with Hurricane Andrew, you've gone from 15 billion of exposure to 150 
 billion of exposure. That's much more short-term and it dwarfs the climate change 
 in whatever analysis you're given. Like, that has a very real effect. You've already 
 factored that in and it's a bold increase of exposure if the exact same thing 
 happens, so that's explicit. The climate change isn't a problem of that event 
 happening today. At this juncture, there's certainly some re-evaluation of 
 probability, but I wouldn't say explicitly, driven by climate change. I think it's just 
 more driven by observations and trends and all that. I think it's definitely there; 
 it's just not a large driver today.” 
 
Both participant 102 and 103 believed that short-term risks were more relevant to the cat 
bond market and should have more of an effect on risk analysis and pricing. 
Incorporating climate change into risk modelling was viewed as a long-term strategy that 
was not of immediate necessity.  
 Participant 101 argued that climate change was incorporated into risk modelling 
as much as possible. When asked the same question, the participant said climate change 
was factored into risk analysis “As much as it can be”. The participant continued,  
 “The investors tend to get the data and the view of risk with just the standard 
 model output, and then with a stressed sensitivity test from the models, which 
 simulates things like warm sea surface temperatures… Air temperatures and 
 things like that, and then the general warming of the climate, I mean, as I said, 
 they look at warm sea surface temperature scenarios, which covers a lot of that. 
106	  
	  
 But to be honest with you, I mean these are risk models and climate models. They 
 do allow you to make changes based on that and people do look at that. But, I 
 don't know of a modelling platform that provides a definitive view of what the 
 climate is going to be like in 20-30 years time. All you can do is apply factors of 
 maybe its two degrees warmer, maybe the sea levels two feet higher. And see how 
 that affects your scenario models and then how that affects the covered portfolio. 
 And people do that all the time, that's kind of what their job is in the modelling 
 department.” 
 
 Generally, the participants believed that risk modelling techniques were robust 
and as accurate as possible. They saw short-term, immediate risks as more relevant to risk 
modelling. They agreed that there is not one right way to view risk and there is not a 
standard model of risk. The risk modelling companies provide various simulations and 
possibilities depending on what the climate may be like in the future. However, a lack of 
a standard agreement on to what degree climate change factors should be included in risk 
modelling seems problematic. If risk modellers are presenting standard model outputs as 
well as stressed sensitivity tests with various predictions for the future climate, how is the 
level of risk decided? The process of risk modelling does not seem dangerous or 
problematic if we assume that climate risks are being estimated and accounted for 
accurately. However, based on the lack of standardization, it is impossible to account for 
this. If risks are being underestimated in the modelling process, the significance and 
pricing of risks could be incorrect and lead to economic and adaptive challenges.  
 The modelling of natural catastrophe risks represents an important step in the 
individuation through commensuration mechanism of financialization. This process of 
risk modelling identifies risk, converting it to a particular level based on their models. 
This process is key in converting natural catastrophe risks into exchangeable assets by 
placing boundaries on these disasters based on their possible effects and agreeing upon a 
transferable value based on this model of risk. The concentration of modelling companies 
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also signifies the commensuration stage of financialization. The concentration of the risk 
modelling on specific companies demonstrates the similar metrics of evaluation and 
material boundaries used to covert environmental risks into assets and commensurate 
risks.  
 5.3.3 Trigger Types 
An important aspect of the individuation through commensuration mechanism of 
financialization involves defining a metric of evaluation and putting legal and material 
boundaries around a specific asset in order to define a standard and make the asset 
transferable. Identifying a trigger type for a cat bond is a definitive example of 
simplifying the variables and defining a clear metric to simplify the transferability of 
catastrophic risk. Trigger types are conditions that identify the exact circumstances for 
pay out of a cat bond.  
 The quantitative data results identified the top trigger types used in the cat bond 
market. Table 8 identified each trigger type based on bond issuance and dollar issuance. 
The indemnity trigger type was identified as the most dominant trigger type in the market 
with between 47 and 39 percent of bonds using this trigger type. Industry loss was the 
second most dominant, with between 24 and 25 percent of the market. Parametric was the 
third most dominant, with between 16 and 11 percent of the market. Figure 10 illustrated 
how different trigger types have dominated the market through its history. The indemnity 
trigger has been the most dominant since 2010. However, prior to that, the parametric 
trigger was the most dominant from 2001 to 2008. The industry loss trigger was the most 
dominant in 1999 and 2006.  
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 Based on their expertise, participants were asked to explain why they thought the 
indemnity trigger has become the most dominant trigger type on the market. Participant 
101 identified two reasons for the dominance of the indemnity trigger on the market, 
 “I think the reason it dominated was two-fold. One, the insurers and reinsurers 
 who want protection, that's what they're used to, that's how they're used to buying 
 protection. And the insurance and reinsurance industry is notoriously slow at 
 embracing new ways of doing things. The second reason is that brokers have 
 really pushed the market in that direction as well. The brokers have been very 
 keen to be able to offer a cat bond as a comparable product. Now if you talked to 
 some of the biggest investors in the space, they will all tell you that they would 
 much rather have a portfolio of parametric cat bonds. Because for them, that 
 makes life so much easier. But the insurance and reinsurance industry really is 
 not yet capable of stepping away from the indemnity paradigm and looking at 
 how to buy protection in a more parametric manner.” 
 
Participant 101 explained that the insurance and reinsurance industry prefers the 
indemnity trigger, while investors have a preference for the parametric trigger. 
Participant 102 and 103 gave answers that were consistent with this opinion, but 
explained the reasons for the insurer and investors preference. Participant 102 explained, 
 “In the past the parametric triggers were you know, a little more prevalent. And 
 the advantage from the investor’s perspective, there is better transparency with 
 the parametric trigger. Indemnity trigger is basically, the investor has to be 
 comfortable with the underwriting of the reinsurer, not just with the frequency 
 and severity of the event, but that's one thing. From the reinsurer or from the 
 insurer perspective, the advantage of the indemnity trigger is that it minimizes the 
 basis risk. With the parametric trigger, they would incur a certain amount of 
 losses, but then from the investors place, the losses are not going to be exactly the 
 same, they will be more or they will be less. And the recovery they get from a 
 catastrophe bond therefore, may be sufficient or it may be more than sufficient. So 
 basis risk is involved in using the parametric trigger. On the other end for 
 indemnity trigger, whatever losses the insurer support, that's what they collect, 
 providing the terms and conditions are met from the catastrophe bond insurance. 
 So there is minimizing of basis risk, and that's one of the reasons why it's a better 
 fit for the insurers. And investors have become more comfortable around doing 
 this thing, partly because they have hired sophisticated underwriters to do the 






Participant 102 continued, 
 
 “Parametric is super-efficient, but it also poses a problem for the insurer, that 
 recoveries are not going to be equivalent to the loss that they take and it reaches 
 the basis risk. And as investors become more sophisticated in understanding the 
 underwriting of what's insured, most parties have come to the conclusion, you 
 know, that indemnity makes sense for better functioning of the market and for the 
 market to grow.” 
 
Participant 103 provided a similar answer, agreeing that investors would prefer the 
parametric trigger, as it is more straightforward and simple for them, 
 “This is oversimplified, but the only reason bonds were structured on a 
 parametric trigger originally was to keep it simple for the investors. So if there's a 
 hurricane, let's say that's the parameter, you know what that is, you don't really 
 care whether the insurance company issued the policy. You just say, this event 
 occurs, I pay.” 
 
Participant 103 gave an example of how the parametric trigger can result in a mismatch 
of funds, where too much or too little coverage can be provided even when the parametric 
circumstances are met, 
 “There was a bond in Mexico, that had- not a full recovery- but a partial  
 recovery. And it was intended to cover emergency services if there's an 
 earthquake in Mexico. So they said, "oh this is a really good mechanism because 
 when there's an emergency, we want a quick recovery. So we want it to be 
 parametric, we get the money and we're able to deploy immediately". It made all 
 the sense in the world. The problem, when the events occurred, parametrically, 
 there wasn't actually an emergency. It wasn't a big populated area, and so they 
 got the recovery but they didn't really need it. So in a way, there was absolutely a 
 mismatch. For all of those reasons, the market's moving more towards indemnity, 
 so there's going to be less of a mismatch, you know, so I think the market is 
 actually addressing that problem by shifting from the parametric to the 
 indemnity.” 
 
While the parametric trigger may seem more straightforward for investors as they know 
exactly when to pay out and by how much, examples like the one given by participant 
103 indicate that indemnity may be a better fit for the market as it eliminates basis risk 
and ensures that sponsors will receive what is needed to cover damages.  
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 The qualitative and quantitative research results were consistent in analyzing 
trigger types. The interviews helped to add insight and clarity into why particular trigger 
types prevailed. By utilizing particular trigger types and centering the market around one 
or two particular triggers, the liquidity and transferability of natural catastrophe risk is 
simplified. These trigger types are a clear example of defining specific metrics and 
boundaries to an asset in order to simplify the exchange process. Defining a trigger type 
is an important example of the individuation through commensuration mechanism of 
financialization as it relates to the liquidity process of cat bonds.  
 5.3.4 Ratings  
As mentioned in section 4.2.6, around 45 percent of all cat bond data that was analyzed 
did not provide any rating information. This rating data is included in the discussion for 
personal interest, but should be given limited bearing based on the significant portion of 
data that was not rated. Between 34 and 31 percent of cat bonds were given a substantial 
credit risk rating. Between 19 and 17 percent of cat bonds were given a high credit risk 
rating. The rating of a bond is an important step in the liquidity process as it provides 
investors with important information and allows them to categorize different assets 
through an established metric of evaluation. These ratings can help investors to make 
important decisions about adding particular assets to their portfolios and evaluating risk.  
 Participant 101 was asked to comment on why cat bonds were given substantial or 
high credit risk in their ratings, 
 “The reason they're rated not very highly is because… the rating was based on 
 the lowest of the counterparty credit risk and the catastrophe risk. And it's  always 
 the catastrophe risk. And that is the major risk in there. And that's what the credit 
 rating is based on. So it's not really- I don't know- nobody rates cat bonds 
 anymore. I haven't seen a cat bond rated, or actually there's been one tranche of 
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 a cat bond that's been rated so far this year, out of 60 or 70 tranches. Nobody 
 bothers anymore because the investors don't want them because they know they're 
 not really reflective of the risk that they're really worried about. A cat bond is a 
 pure catastrophe risk, there's not real counterparty risk, because the collateral is 
 held in trust accounts in as good as cash. There's no default risk apart from the 
 catastrophe happening really. So, yeah, I don't know, I wouldn't read too much 
 into the ratings the rating agencies give them.” 
 
Participant 101 explained that the ratings are particularly low because of the high 
catastrophic risk inherent in cat bonds. Typically, low ratings represent things such as 
high counterparty credit risk or default risk. However, as cat bonds are virtually 
uncorrelated to the wider financial market and have little to no counterparty credit risk, 
their low ratings are a result of another risk. The risk of the natural catastrophe occurring 
and the bond triggering is the reason for the low credit ratings that cat bonds are given.  
 Investors that are in the cat bond market are assumed to be aware of the natural 
catastrophe risk they are taking on when investing in a cat bond. Depending on one’s 
view of risk, natural catastrophe risk could be deemed more substantial than typical asset 
investment risks, such as default or counterparty credit risk. However, if investors are 
accustomed to viewing ratings based on typical asset investment risks and are aware of 
the substantial or high catastrophe risk they are taking when investing in cat bonds, the 
ratings may not be important or indicate anything substantial. Although, it may be helpful 
to remind investors of the high risk involved in investing in cat bonds through the rating 
system. The rating system supports the commensuration stage of financialization by using 
clear metrics of evaluation in order to make assets transferable. These ratings can be 
viewed as boundaries or standards used in order to simplify the process of transforming 




5.4 Displacement through Mobilization  
 Catastrophe bonds exemplify this mechanism of financialization through their 
complex market trading infrastructures and investments. While catastrophe bonds 
represent risks that are embedded in a particular time and space, by transforming risks 
into financial figures and selling them to investors, the risk is displaced and mobilized 
from the real temporal and spatial aspects. This section of the discussion will analyze the 
process of exchange in the cat bond market by evaluating the placement/structuring 
agents, investors and market growth.  
 5.4.1 Placement/Structuring Agents 
In evaluating the displacement through mobilization mechanism of financialization as it 
relates to cat bonds, an important aspect are the actors involved in mobilizing the transfer 
of the assets and facilitating trades. The placement/structuring agents are directly 
involved in the market infrastructure which facilitates the process of exchange and 
investor participation. These agents mobilize the assets by structuring a deal between 
sponsors and investors and further displacing natural catastrophes from their real spatial 
and temporal aspects.  
 The quantitative results section of this paper identified the top five 
placement/structuring agents by total cat bond dollar issuance and bond issuance. Table 
10 and 11 identified the top placement/structuring agents in the cat bond market as 
Goldman Sachs, Swiss Re, Aon Benfield Securities, GC Securities and Willis Capital 
Markets. These agents are large corporations providing reinsurance, advisory services, 
securities and investment management and banking services. These corporations are 
responsible for structuring deals, dividing up bond profiles, marketing the bonds to 
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investors and facilitating transactions. Participant 101 explained the role of brokers and 
structuring agents in the cat bond market, 
 “They'll [the sponsors] engage sort of a broker/dealer type, capital markets unit, 
 who will look at different possible structures and tranching the transaction and 
 things like that. And then, I would say it's probably a 4 month process still for a 
 full blown cat bond from the initial modelling beginning through to actually sort 
 of running the book and marketing it to investors. The bit that’s really sped up in 
 recent years is the investor allocations to it. So, going back 10 years, deals could 
 be marketed 3  months and then they have a round of meetings around the world 
 with investors  and things, now a days that usually happens in about 2 weeks. So 
 that's really sped up a little bit.” 
 
The role of these agents is vital to the mobilization of natural catastrophe risks through 
cat bonds. Financialization seeks to constantly mobilize assets more quickly and easily. 
As explained by participant 101, this process of structuring and tranching the transaction, 
marketing the bond and facilitating a trade has sped up recently. The role of third party 
agents in facilitating these transactions represents how assets are displaced in space and 
time through market infrastructures designed to mobilize assets as quickly as possible.  
 5.4.2 Investors 
The key actors involved in the mobilization of natural catastrophe risks are the investors 
that invest in cat bonds and offer capital to cover these risks. The types of investors 
involved in the cat bond market and their role in the displacement of natural catastrophe 
risks from spatial and temporal aspects is key to understanding the displacement through 
mobilization mechanism of financialization. In discussing investors in the cat bond 
market, this section will draw solely on interview results. There is no available data on 
investors in the space as there is no requirement to disclose investor information. The 
participants are very knowledgeable about the types of investors in the market based on 
their own experience with cat bonds and relationships with investors.  
114	  
	  
 Participant 101 explained the types of investors that are typically involved in the 
cat bond market based on sponsor expectations, 
 “The insurers and reinsurers who issue cat bonds want to see institutional money 
 on the back end of it because that's one of the things that gives them comfort, that 
 the moneys always going be there, and that these are people that are going help 
 them grow this market into sort of a more meaningful piece of their reinsurance 
 as well. Cause that's really important to the sponsors, they want to know that this 
 is not just investors who are here to bet, and try and make a quick sort of buck out 
 of this market. They want people who are going to be there year after year after 
 year after year, so that their reinsurance program they can make use of the 
 capital markets increasingly. So they want to see the big pension funds of the 
 world, the big investment banks and things like that, backing these things.” 
 
Participant 102 echoed this sentiment, indicating concern from sponsors about the types 
of investors in the space. Sponsors want to ensure that these investors will stick around 
and continue to provide capital after disasters,  
 “There is always this question in the mind of insurers in general, if there is a 
 large event, would the capital market investors be around after the event, and 
 continue to provide them the coverage? You know, historically we have had a few 
 events and the capital market has just continued to grow and the cat bond market 
 has continued to grow. So, it's very encouraging to see that.” 
 
Sponsors want to keep large scale institutional investors in the cat bond market in order 
to ensure that they are able to provide continued capital funds to cover their reinsurance 
needs. Participant 101 argued that more investors are continually being drawn to the cat 
bond market as it becomes more familiar to them, 
 “The returns that investors are willing to accept continue to come down as more 
 and more investors become familiar with the asset class. So there are more and 
 more investors now looking to enter the asset class who've spent, in some cases, I 
 know people who spent 8 to 10 years analyzing the space before they actually 
 deployed any capital into it. And as they come online, some of them are quite big, 
 and they have quite a lot of money to deploy.” 
 
Participant 102 explained that investors are becoming more comfortable with the market, 
“Investors have become more sophisticated. They have developed or acquired tools for 
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doing the analysis. They’ve hired the right people to do the analysis, and it develops and 
becomes very specialized”. Participant 102 continued, explaining why the cat bond 
market was so compelling to investors, 
 “For investors, investing into catastrophe bonds provides a very compelling- 
 there is a compelling argument for that. Based on that the underlying 
 fundamental drivers of losses in catastrophe bonds are completely uncorrelated 
 with macroeconomic factors…Moreover, even within the catastrophe bond, 
 different perils have virtually zero correlation… So it serves a very important 
 purpose from that perspective in a portfolio of an investor. The catch is though, 
 catastrophe risk is by nature something that is a tail risk and unstable by nature. 
 So investors need to be very sophisticated in understanding and taking this risk. 
 To the extent that what I laid out, that they have a complete understanding and 
 can do a complete analysis, it serves a really good purpose and moves your 
 efficient frontier in the portfolio in the right direction, improving your risk 
 tolerance profile.” 
 
Participant 103 explained that the market is continually getting more complex for 
investors as they become more comfortable with the market risks,  
 “It's getting more complex. You're not talking about very simple clean risks 
 anymore. You're talking about much more complicated exposures being assumed 
 by the market. And that's simply because as the market gets comfortable with this, 
 they're willing to take up more and more. So it used to be that the cat bond market 
 was 1 percent risk paying 8 percent spreads and it was all either parametric or 
 index based. Now, you're seeing a wide range of loss expectations, a wide range 
 of yields, you're seeing all sorts of exposures being transferred into the capital 
 market. So it's just a much more complicated market than it was in the past.” 
 
As investors become more comfortable with taking on catastrophe risks and the market 
becomes more complicated and complex, there are concerns that the cat bond market 
could pose systemic risk to the financial system. As discussed in the literature review, 
scholars have criticized the cat bond market for underpricing catastrophic risk and risking 
large sums of money being lost when the bonds eventually trigger. Participants were 
asked whether they thought that cat bonds could pose systemic risk to the financial 
market. The participants did not agree with this argument, noting that the cat bond market 
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is much too small to cause any systemic damage to the broader financial market. 
Participant 102 argued, 
 “I will put it this way, the catastrophe bond market- or I’ll go beyond that and say 
 if you look at the entire property catastrophe reinsurance market, and say if you 
 look at that versus the size of the capital market, it’s apples and oranges. I mean, 
 the capital market is multiple times the size of the catastrophe bond market. In 
 any investor’s portfolio, typically cat bonds would be 1 to 2 percent and 
 sometimes even less than 1 percent of the portfolio. How can that cause 
 significant disruption to that particular investors portfolio if something goes 
 wrong?” 
 
Participant 101 echoed this point, arguing, “It's a 28 billion dollar market at the moment. 
It's really quite tiny compared to the sort of market that would cause a systemic default 
risk anywhere in the world”. Despite participants’ beliefs that the market was too small 
to cause systemic risk, they each pointed out the importance of investors being aware of 
the risks before entering the market. Participant 102 said, 
 “It is very important for investors to be able to analyze this risk properly because 
 it's not a typical risk that you see in other asset classes. Because at the end of the 
 day, you are providing tail protection, you are providing catastrophe protection. 
 It needs to be understood very well by the investors and that becomes very 
 important. And so far we have seen it has been that investors engage specialized 
 managers, you know investment managers to do that analysis, or hired very 
 sophisticated underwriters in their own organization to do the underwriting and 
 analysis and things like that. So that's very encouraging.” 
 
Participant 103 made a similar point, noting, 
 
 “That was kind of a binary scary, like all good or all bad. What we're really 
 seeing is market-pricing adjusting…There's some supply and demand of capital 
 out there, and it's a good compliment to portfolios, but it's certainly not a 
 solution. It certainly shouldn't replace the totality of anyone's investment 
 portfolio. It should be a component. And as long as people are handling it that 
 way, it's definitely not going to expose the financial market to systemic risk. You 
 still have to be very careful, individual participants, if you're going to be in this 
 market, you've got to know what you're getting in to. But yeah, I don't see 
 systemic risk, and even more so, if there were to be a big event that were to wipe 
 out a lot of the capital, I believe there's a lot of money on the sidelines that would 
 actually come in, recognizing that there's probably going to be a rate increase 
 that they can take advantage of. So I think it's a pretty sustainable market at this 
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 juncture. I don't see a lot of things derailing it. So, I think it's a healthy 
 component, not a disruptive component.” 
 
All of the participants dismissed the possibility of systemic risk based on the size of the 
market and the calibre of investor. Each participant explained the importance of investors 
understanding the market risks before entering the market. Participant 101 also noted the 
importance of investors being fully aware before entering the market. The participant 
argued that the investors in the market are responsible and aware,  
 
 “It's like any financial market. You have investors who potentially might get into it 
 who don't understand what the market is. But, I mean the investors I know in this 
 space are not betting that there isn't going to be a catastrophe. They are willing to 
 take on the risk that there is a catastrophe because they feel the return is worth 
 having. They feel that's a risk worth taking, compared to the risk of other asset 
 classes. So if you think of what else they could put their money in, they could put 
 it in infrastructure, they could put it in environmental bonds, green bonds, they 
 could put it in mortgage bonds, whatever it happens to be. The risk-return kind of 
 toss up between one asset class and another makes cat bonds seem quite 
 attractive to the investors. So they aren't- these aren't people who believe there's 
 not going to be a hurricane for another 10 years in Florida, these are people who 
 accept that there will be a hurricane at some point and they will lose a lot of 
 money at that point, but they feel the return they get is worth having.” 
 
While all of the participants agreed that the cat bond market did not seem to pose any 
significant systemic risk, participant 102 noted that it could potentially cause crisis for the 
insurance industry,  
 “If for any reason capital markets become the dominant provider of reinsurance 
 protection in property catastrophe and something like a large event takes place 
 and suddenly investors become sour on it, then the insurance industry might 
 actually see crisis go up for their protection. So I don't think it is actually going to 
 disrupt the capital market, but it could disrupt the insurance industry. Although I 
 personally believe that is unlikely given that the investors so far have shown clear 
 understanding of the risks they're taking and investors have understood what the 
 risks are.” 
 
The participants did not show concern over systemic risk from the cat bond market. They 
expressed the importance of investor diligence before entering the market, but seemed 
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confident that investors in the market were prepared and aware of the risks. The market is 
arguably too small to cause any significant systemic risk to the financial system.  
 While the cat bond market may currently be too small to cause any concern over 
systemic risk, participants also discussed the continual and expanding growth witnessed 
in the history of the market. Although cat bond investment may currently represent an 
insignificant risk to the financial market based on its limited size, the increasing growth 
of the market may be a cause for future concern. If we assume that investors entering the 
cat bond market are diligent and aware of the risks, the market may not pose any 
significant danger for underestimating catastrophic risks. However, as participants noted, 
more investors are entering the market and taking on more complex and substantial risks. 
If these investors continue to become more and more comfortable with these types of 
catastrophic risks, and coverage continues to become more and more complex, how can 
we ensure that investors are not under evaluating these risks? As the cat bond market 
continues to grow and catastrophic risks are continually transformed into assets and 
mobilized through investors, can we be confident that investors are accurately analyzing 
risks? As discussed in section 5.3.2, there are many different views of risk and climate 
change. If climate change risks are underestimated through this process of mobilization 
and displacement, there is cause for economic and adaptive concerns.  
 5.4.3 Market Growth 
In order to demonstrate the effective financialization of natural catastrophes through 
displacement and mobilization, the market growth of cat bonds provides an effectual 
example. The quantitative results illustrated in Figure 8 showed the steady and 
cumulative growth the cat bond market has seen since inception. In the most recent six 
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months, from December 2016 to June 2017, there has been an increase of 8.3 billion USD 
in cumulative growth.  
 All of the participants responses were consistent with the quantitative findings, in 
that each of them argued that the market was continually growing by more substantial 
amounts every year. Participant 101 noted, 
 “There has been more transactions in the last month or so then we've ever seen at 
 this time of year. This is always the busiest time of year but this year is the busiest 
 by far. The issuance for 2017 is already past seven billion, which is ahead of the 
 full year issuance in 2016. The market has just hit another record, it's just passed 
 28 billion, the outstanding size of it, which is the third time this year it's reached a 
 record.” 
 
Participant 102 argued that the market would continue to grow as a result of society 
becoming wealthier and property values continuing to increase,  
 “In general, if you think about it, as people become, for lack of a better word, 
 more affluent, the society becomes more affluent, the property values go up, there 
 is more disposable income available, there is need for better protection anyway, 
 so we expect this market to continue to grow.” 
	  
The cat bond market has a cumulative issuance of approximately 88 billion USD and an 
outstanding issuance of approximately 28 billion USD. While the market is still relatively 
small, it has continued to grow consistently since its inception. As climate change risks 
may create more need for property protection, the cat bond market could see even more 







5.5 Financialization and Implications for Spatial and Temporal Compression  
The analysis and discussion of the quantitative and qualitative methods and results for 
this paper have attempted to expose catastrophe bonds as a form of financialization 
enabling spatial and temporal compression. This section will analyze how the results 
have successfully exposed cat bonds as a form of financialization through the three 
mechanisms of financialization framework analysis. Then the implications of this 
analysis for the spatial and temporal compression of natural catastrophes will be 
discussed. 
 The actors and processes involved in developing and distributing cat bonds were 
identified within each mechanism of financialization. By exposing cat bonds as utilizing 
each mechanism of financialization through the framework analysis, they are exposed as 
a form of financialization. The steps involved in developing and distributing a cat bond 
are the same steps involved in the financialization of any asset. Catastrophe bonds 
exemplified each mechanism of financialization through the process of ownership, 
commensuration and mobilization. Catastrophe bonds turn natural catastrophes into 
assets by privatizing the risks through the sponsor’s claim of ownership. This ownership 
is further privatized through the increasing concentration of actors. Then, these natural 
catastrophe risks are given a monetary value and specific metrics and boundaries through 
risk modelling, pricing, trigger types and investment ratings. The assets are then 
mobilized through an established market infrastructure of structuring agents and brokers 
who facilitate this displacement and sell these risks to investors.  
 Returning to the original concept of financialization used for the purposes of this 
thesis by Knox-Hayes’ (2013), cat bonds can now be exposed as a form of 
financialization. As discussed in the literature review, financialization diminishes the 
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importance of use value over exchange value through a distortion of material values. 
Commodities are abstracted from their real space and time, and future use value is treated 
as present value. Catastrophe bonds remove natural catastrophe risk from real space and 
time and reduce risks to financial exchange values. The future costs of these risks are 
treated as present costs to be bought and exchanged in the market. In this sense, 
catastrophe bonds are a clear example of the financialization of natural resources and 
material values.  
 Cat bonds transform material risks into exchange values through a process of 
financialization, thus, converting physical space and time into social space and time. 
Natural catastrophe risks are removed from their spatial and temporal materiality and 
treated as abstract exchangeable values through their mobilization in the market. As the 
exchange values of these catastrophic risks become more abstracted from the use value 
and the real spatial and temporal materiality of these natural systems, they can become 
devalued. Catastrophe bonds divorce financial value from the material context they seek 
to represent. This process of converting environmental risk into exchange value creates 
distortions in the representation of climate change risk and value and could lead to 








5.6 Final Observations 
 Although catastrophe bonds are an effective way to transfer risk through the 
capital market, they could result in an undervaluation of risk. While the insurance and 
reinsurance industry cannot be blamed for engaging in financialization as a solution to 
risk management, these tools should be used with caution and diligence. Cat bonds are 
not widely viewed as a means of adaptation to climate change, but rather, as a short-term 
risk transfer solution. In this regard, the cat bond market will not likely view climate 
change with any immediacy until the market starts to see loss activity as a result. This 
view is not problematic if we assume that climate change risks are long-term, predictable, 
and will emerge in years to come. We would also need to assume that if climate change 
events appear abundantly and loss activity increases, the cat bond market and actors 
within the industry will respond with immediacy. If climate change risks are short-term 
and occur in a shorter time frame than the industry predicts, when will a sense of urgency 
or immediacy kick in? If climate change risks are rapid, unpredictable and occur in the 
short-term, who will claim ownership of these risks? Will actors in the cat bond market 
react to climate change events in time? Will there ever be a sense of immediacy in 
responding to climate change?   
 If climate change risks materialize sooner than predicted, the market may 
experience dangerous losses. As the cat bond market continues to see increasing growth 
and investment, investors need to be diligent and aware of the risks they are taking. 
However, as the future climate is unpredictable, is it possible for these investors to be 
fully aware of the risks? The catastrophe bond market provides short-term risk coverage 
to insurers and short-term economic gains for investors, however, the long-term 
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consequences that could arise based on the rapid and unpredictable nature of climate 




















6. Conclusion, Contributions and Recommendations   
6.1 Introduction 
As the catastrophe bond market continues to see increasing growth and becomes a more 
prominent way of dealing with climate change disaster risk, the ability for cat bonds to 
adequately address environmental risks comes into question. There is a propensity for 
environmental risks or problems to be represented through financial figures and 
addressed through the marketplace. Catastrophe bonds are indicative of this trend as they 
transform environmental risks into financial figures and trade these risks through the 
market. This thesis sought to investigate how catastrophe bonds represent a form of 
financialization that enables time-space compression.  
 Through an explanatory sequential mixed methods approach to the study, this 
question was effectively answered. By utilizing quantitative data analysis and qualitative 
semi-structured interview results, cat bonds were proven to exemplify the three 
mechanisms of financialization. This analysis exposed cat bonds as a form of 
financialization. The process of financialization and the implications of the separation of 
natural catastrophes from their spatial and temporal materiality were discussed.  
 Through a utilization of both quantitative and qualitative results, cat bonds were 
analyzed based on the actors and processes involved in their development and 
distribution. Each actor and process fit into a specific mechanism inherent in the 
financialization of assets. Through this analysis, cat bonds were exposed as a form of 
financialization. The implications of the financialization of environmental risks were 
discussed and cat bonds were demonstrated to enable the temporal and spatial 
compression of natural catastrophes.  
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6.2 Contributions of this Thesis: Research and Practice 
This thesis provides contributions to academic researchers and practitioners. There are 
three primary contributions this thesis makes to research. The first is an extension of the 
critical literature on catastrophe bonds. Research on cat bonds to date has primarily 
focused on their structure, development, popularity, and what their usage means for the 
insurance and investment industry. While there has been some significant critical 
literature on cat bonds, this thesis has extended these critiques. It has provided a clear 
map of the infrastructure and networks of catastrophe bonds and laid this map on the 
foundation of a process of financialization. This thesis has exposed cat bonds as a form of 
financialization enabling temporal and spatial compression of natural catastrophes. The 
research can contribute to critical literature of cat bonds through its exposure of this 
method of insurance risk management as a potentially dangerous tool for addressing 
environmental risks. 
 The second contribution to academic literature that this thesis provides is a 
connection between financialization, time-space compression, and insurance risk 
management. While research on each of the three topics individually is widespread, there 
has been limited research connecting these concepts, particularly regarding the explosive 
cat bond market. This thesis research filled a gap in analyzing cat bonds from a critical 
financialization lens. This thesis connected the theories of financialization and time-space 
compression with climate change risk management in the insurance industry through an 
in-depth analysis of cat bonds. It exposed cat bonds as a form of financialization through 
their decoupling of the spatial and temporal aspects of natural catastrophes and connected 
the two theoretical concepts to develop a critique.  
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 The third contribution that this thesis provides to academic literature is a broader 
critique of the ability for market mechanisms to address environmental problems. Cat 
bonds are representative of the broader inclination for environmental problems to be 
addressed through market mechanisms and financialization. By exposing the process of 
turning environmental risks into financial values, the limits of financialization as a 
method of addressing environmental problems were revealed. Therefore, this research is 
representative and informative of other forms of financialization of environmental 
problems such as carbon permit trading or weather derivatives. A significant contribution 
of this research is its exposure of the broader issues involved in the transformation of 
material problems into market values and how this can result in an undervaluation of 
natural systems. 
 This thesis also provides contributions to practitioners in the field of cat bonds. 
This research can reveal insights to both investors and sponsors involved in the cat bond 
market. The thesis has exposed critiques of cat bonds and the importance of investor 
awareness and diligence prior to entering the market. It has also highlighted the dangers 
that insurance companies can encounter if they rely fully on cat bonds for their risk 
management needs. Most importantly, this thesis addressed some of the assumptions 
made by practitioners in the cat bond market about the relevance and immediacy of 
climate change risks. It highlighted the potential economic and adaptive dangers the 
industry could face if they do not address climate change risks in the modelling, 






6.3 Recommendations for Future Research  
Through the discussion section of this thesis, a number of questions were posed that 
could be relevant and of interest for future research in the catastrophe bond market. The 
first involves the inclusion of the developing world in the cat bond market. An interesting 
area of research would be to analyze whether the developing world would reap benefits 
or disadvantages if cat bonds were used as a form of risk management in the Third 
World. The touted opportunities that cat bonds pose for risk management in the 
developing world would be an interesting area of inquiry to study and analyze.  
 Another interesting area for future research would be an in-depth analysis of the 
catastrophe modelling performed by risk modelling companies. While there is currently 
no standardized models or views of risk, it would be interesting to analyze the type of 
models being used to identify future risks and how seriously these models take climate 
change threats. In addition, the actions of investors and sponsors in the cat bond market 
in regards to climate change risks would also be an interesting avenue for study. An 
analysis of the long or short-term approaches to climate change risks in the industry 
would be a worthy area for future research.  
 A final recommendation for future research in this field would be a study of the 
investor and financial risks cat bonds could pose for the financial market. While the 
information was unavailable for the purposes of this study, it would be interesting to 
research the types of investors that are involved in cat bond trading and what their view 
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Appendix A: Semi-Structured Interview Questions 
1. What actors are typically involved in the development and distribution of cat bonds?  
2. What are some of the benefits of cat bonds to the insurance and reinsurance industry? 
3. What processes are involved in determining the value of a cat bond? What factors and 
conditions can drive pricing? 
4. What challenges, if any, do you think risk analysis techniques pose? (In terms of data 
gaps or the domination of the market by 2-3 companies) 
5. Can you think of any disadvantages of cat bonds for the insurance or reinsurance 
industry? 
6. The indemnity trigger seems to me the most popular in the market right now. Do you 
have any comments about the benefits or disadvantages of this trigger type and why you 
think it has dominated the market? 
7. How would you say that the effects of a changing climate are factored into cat bond 
pricing and risk analysis? 
8. What is your personal opinion of cat bonds as a means of addressing insurance risk? 
9. Climate change and warming temperatures are widely believed to result in an increase 
in natural disasters. What role do you think cat bonds can play in adapting to climate 
change, if at all? 
10. One argument put forward by academics for the use of cat bonds is that they can help 
the developing world manage risk by accessing global funds to cover disasters. However, 
right now the bond market is overwhelmingly centred in the US. Do you think that cat 
bonds could result in insurance for the rich only? What is your opinion of this argument? 
11. Some scholars have argued that catastrophe bonds can pose systemic risk for the 
financial market through a collective underpricing of catastrophic risk leading to large 
financial losses. What do you think of this argument?  
12. Are there any recent changes or trends that you are aware of now in the ILS 
marketplace?   
 
